In Chapter 2, the working of H.323 and SIP protocols was explained. This chapter explains how to set up an infrastructure including H.323 and/or SIP components and gives real-world examples of configuration for popular equipment. The focus will be on setting up basic services, meaning the equipment that is necessary to provide basic call services, authentication and billing.

4.1 General concepts

Before giving examples on how to set up SIP or H.323 zones using equipment from specific vendors, this section introduces the general concepts. With these concepts in mind, it will be easier to understand the vendor-specific parts that follow.

4.1.1 Architecture

Chapter 2 introduced us to the architectures of pure H.323 and SIP environments. Basically, there is one central server and multiple telephony endpoints registering with that server. The server’s task, among others, is to resolve a dialled address to an IP target. However, when we talk about real-world set-ups, this server infrastructure tends to be more complicated. The reasons for this are:

- usage of redundant servers to increase availability or provide load balancing (see Section 4.1.2);
- usage of multiple servers, e.g., for branch offices;
- more than one signalling protocol.

There are two possibilities to support multiple signalling protocols within one zone: have servers with built-in support for every protocol or have dedicated servers for each protocol and signalling gateways between them.

A server that supports more than one signalling protocol (see Figure 4.1) is the best solution. It is easier to manage since there is just one configuration to take care of and there will not be any problems with server-to-server interaction.

Unfortunately, there seems to be no equipment that provides fully-featured SIP and H.323 support on the same machine.\(^1\)

If a zone includes both a SIP Proxy as well as an H.323 Gatekeeper, then call routing inside the domain becomes an issue. A signalling gateway is required to enable an H.323 endpoint to call a SIP endpoint and vice versa (see Figure 4.2).

1. Actually there is a product that claims support for both SIP and H.323 protocols: the Asterisk PBX. See: http://www.asterisk.org/. How well it supports SIP and H.323 is not yet known.
The gateway is used to translate signalling between the two worlds. The media stream may still be exchanged directly between the endpoints, but eventually (see Section 5.1.4.4) the gateway needs to transcode different codecs, even if both endpoints support the same codec. This problem might occur if either the gateway or the entity calling the gateway (endpoint or gatekeeper) does not support FastConnect (see Section 2.2.1.5.1).

An architectural problem similar to the last one is the use of servers that feature a proprietary IP Telephony protocol and provide a SIP or an H.323 interface that is limited to basic call functionality without any supplementary services or security features. An example of this is the popular Cisco CallManager.

4.1.1.1 PSTN gateways / PBX migration

The most common scenario for introducing IP Telephony systems is to integrate them with an existing PBX. On the technical side, this usually involves a gateway that translates between H.323 or SIP and QSIG or other protocols over an S2M interface. The services that can be provided between the legacy PBX and the IP world will depend on the QSIG implementation of the PBX and the gateway vendor. There is no general advice here but to test before buying.
Besides technical aspects, organisational aspects of PBX-VoIP integration call for careful planning and analysis. The question is how to integrate legacy and IP Telephony equipment into the dial plan of an organisation. Is it necessary that the phone number reflects whether the participant is a VoIP user or a PBX user.

Generally, there are three possibilities to explore, as explained below. There are more details on setting up an IP Telephony gateway in Section 5.1.

4.1.1.1.1. Routing based on a number prefix
This option requires that, in the dial plan, there is a numberblock available for IP Telephony use. This is easy to implement on legacy PBXs and IP Telephony servers but the result is new phone numbers for every user that switches from legacy to IP Telephony.

Figure 4.3 Routing based on number prefix

In this example, the PBX is configured to forward every call starting with the prefix 8 or 9 to the gateway. The gateway passes the call to one of the IP Telephony servers depending on the prefix 8 or 9. Unknown target prefixes are routed to the legacy PBX. An IP Telephony server only needs to route all internal calls with unknown prefixes to the gateway.

4.1.1.1.2. Per-number routing, one server: per-number routing on the PBX
When migrating from a legacy PBX towards IP Telephony, provision of seamless migration is often required for users switching over from the PBX to the IP world, e.g., when a user decides to switch to IP Telephony but wants to keep his telephone number.

Figure 4.4 Per-number routing
This is quite easy to achieve by setting up a database that stores the information for telephone numbers that belong to the PBX or the IP world (see Figure 4.4). The IP Telephony server and the PBX access the same data to decide where to route a call. Calls to external targets are routed to the PBX and out into the PSTN.

There are variations to this scenario. Indeed, it is quite unusual that an IP Telephony server uses the same database as the PBX, unless they are from the same manufacturer. Then there are two possibilities: setting up a second database suitable for the IP Telephony server (and risk inconsistencies) or let the IP Telephony server route calls to unregistered targets to the PBX. The latter is easier to implement but prevents the discarding of the PBX and the use of IP Telephony providers in the future.

4.1.1.1.3. Per-number routing: more than one server

A similar but more complex scheme is the variant where there is more than one IP Telephony server in the IP world, e.g., a server for each signalling protocol used. In this case, there needs to be a database that contains not only the information about which number shall be reached on the PBX and which in the IP world, but also the information about which IP server (and signalling protocol) to use.

Figure 4.5 Per-number routing with a) two gateways or b) one gateway
The first scenario uses two gateways and thus allows the PBX to decide where to route a call to. IP Telephony servers route calls they cannot resolve locally through a dedicated gateway to the PBX and let it make the routing decision. If both IP Telephony servers support the same signalling protocol, they may contact each other directly (see Section 4.1.1.2).

The second scenario uses only one gateway, so the PBX does not need to know which IP Telephony server to contact, but merely needs to know the fact that the call has an IP target. Components in the IP world share a common configuration database that locates a specific number on server A (e.g., a SIP Proxy) or B (e.g., an H.323 gatekeeper). This allows any server or gateway component to make routing decisions.

The described scenario may vary in many ways. The assumption that all IP components use the same routing database is often difficult to achieve, especially if products from different manufacturers are used, because there is no common format for such entries. In this case, it might well be that a separate database is maintained for each component, leading to administrative overhead for their synchronisation with a high risk of inconsistency.

### 4.1.1.2 Trunking

The bigger an institution is, the more complex its organisational infrastructure. This may be due to the need to support multiple locations (sites) or because certain organisational units need to administer their own communication solutions (and eventually do not adhere to the institution’s standard procedures). Either way, the IP Telephony system probably consists of more than one server, all with the need to share the same dialling space.

#### 4.1.1.2.1 Prefix-based trunking

One possibility of connecting two or more networks is to give each network a different prefix and make routing decisions based upon those prefixes. This works best if the current PSTN dial plan already provides these prefixes, e.g., in the form of area codes plus subscriber prefixes.
This is the classic branch office scenario that is based upon the assumption that both networks have different locations, and that dialling prefixes already exist in the PSTN. This is the same problem as the one already addressed in Section 4.1.1.1.

4.1.1.2 Static individual routing
Prefix-based routing fails to work if you have more than one IP Telephony server and a PBX, all of them within the same dialling address space, and want to allow users to change their legacy PBX phone for an IP phone without switching to a new phone number.

An example of such a scenario is a university that has no structure in its PBX dial plan and that now introduces IP Telephony, but has a computer science faculty that runs its own IP Telephony server. How does the system know where to route a dialled number?

Obviously, a central database storing routing information for each phone number would be a good idea (see Figure 4.7). This usually works, only if all routing entities support the same kind of database, meaning that the legacy PBX and the new IP Telephony server must share the same database. Such a solution is most probably only possible if the PBX and the IP Telephony server come from the same vendor.

Figure 4.7 Static individual trunking

A more likely solution is a model where a PBX ‘knows’ which numbers are located in the IP world and the IP Telephony servers use a shared database that defines which number belongs to which server. If there are different types of IP Telephony servers, it may be that they are unable to share a common routing database in which case each server has its own database, resulting in administration overhead and risk of inconsistency.
4.1.1.2.3 Dynamic individual routing
The previously introduced possibilities required some kind of static configuration to bind a number to a specific server. These scenarios usually end up using at least one routing database, but often more. The requirement for such a burden presumably has its roots in the classic PBX mentality of static configuration. In the IP world, the network offers the possibility of carrying information from one server to another so that IP Telephony protocols provide the means to dynamically exchange routing information. The mechanisms can generally be divided into ‘Push’ and ‘Pull’ techniques. When using a ‘Push’ mechanism, a server informs its peers of every endpoint that registers or un-registers from the server, thus allowing its peer servers to immediately make routing decisions if necessary. On the other hand, care must be taken that servers that are integrated later, be synchronised.

‘Pull’ mechanisms are used when a server asks its peer servers for a target address when it needs to resolve an external target address. The peer giving a positive reply receives the routed call (see Figure 4.8).

In H.323, trunking is achieved by LRQ messages (see Section 7.1.1). SIP has no extra mechanism for address resolution but is able to fan out a call to multiple servers at the same time. Both signalling protocols may use TRIP (see Section 7.1.3) to distribute numeric addresses, but not names.

![Figure 4.8 Dynamic individual trunking](image)

4.1.2. Robustness
A highly-available telephony infrastructure must deal with the fact that an IP Telephony server might crash or be down for administrative reasons. Telephony services can be affected adversely in various ways, when a server goes down and another server takes over. The following are some approaches for implementing robustness in the server infrastructure.
1. The first approach is to set up more than one server for a zone and treat each of them as a separate router (see Section 4.1.1.2.3) that shares the same configuration. In this case, there is no replication of registration or call data across multiple servers.

If the primary server fails, a calling phone will not even notice, at first, because the UDP media stream is usually transmitted directly between the two endpoints. But, the TCP signalling connections do not survive such a crash and so the first TCP message sent afterwards leads to an error and, very likely, to a call clearing.

A phone that is not currently in a call has no way of detecting a server crash in time. After its registration period expires, it will try to refresh its registration with the primary server and fail. It then needs to find a new IP Telephony server. H.323 provides a mechanism called ‘Alternate gatekeeper’ which basically defines that a gatekeeper registering an endpoint informs it of possible secondary gatekeepers that can be used alternatively. The telephone stores this information and, in case of a server failure, tries to contact the other listed gatekeepers.

Another possibility that works for SIP and H.323 is to configure a prioritised list of H.323 Gatekeepers or SIP proxies in a DNS SRV record for the zone. This requires that the telephone is aware of its DNS domain and is able to query DNS servers, a concept that is common in the SIP world, but seldom found in H.323 devices.

In general, without synchronisation between the replicated servers the failure of one server normally results in the loss of all calls. The server loss is discovered after the defined registration timeout, which usually is measured in minutes – but theoretically can also be set to days. After that time, the phones should be able to find an alternate IP Telephony server to register with.

2. Another approach is to use servers that maintain replicated registration data while only one of them is the active server and the other is the standby server. If the active server fails, the standby server detects this instantly and can use the replicated information about which devices are registered to inform all endpoints (phones) that it is now the new active server. As a result, the outage will be noticeable for only a few seconds. Of course, active calls will still be cleared, and definitely not resumed.

3. If the previous approach is pushed a bit further, both servers could replicate every kind of state they keep internally, down to the connection layer. If the active server crashes, the other system takes over and can announce (via ARP) the same MAC address as the crashed server. This kind of ‘Hot Standby Server’ would take over instantly and seamlessly, allowing even ongoing calls to continue without noticeable interruption.

In terms of server infrastructure, this is the most advanced and complicated solution a manufacturer could implement. It does not require the phones to be intelligent or support any kind of robustness-mechanisms. The downside of this approach is that the rewriting-mechanisms ARP might not work in switched networks, which would force both servers to be in the same shared network segment.

It is hard to give general advice on which kind of robustness-mechanism to use. The third solution allows the use of ‘dumb’ endpoints because operation of the backup server is completely...
transparent to them, reducing the cost of endpoint equipment. The other two solutions offer the possibility of putting the redundant server into different buildings, allowing the telephone system to operate even if one building burns down. A general observation is that telephones having the capability to switch servers immediately are not very common, and servers supporting Hot Standby, as described above, are equally hard to obtain.

Every manufacturer that offers IP Telephony solutions implements some robustness-mechanism. One should be aware of the endpoint requirements that must be met to take advantage of the mechanism offered.

### 4.1.3 Management issues

When setting up an IP Telephony infrastructure, certain issues concerning administration tasks should be considered ahead of time.

#### 4.1.3.1 Multiple account databases

The need to migrate legacy and IP Telephony gives rise to the problem of maintaining multiple account databases. The legacy PBX already has a configuration that defines valid numbers. The same usually applies to an IP Telephony server (see Figure 4.4). A shared configuration database for both the PBX and the IP Telephony server is very uncommon, unless they are of the same manufacturer and have similar configuration interfaces. Of course, keeping two separate databases consistent is difficult in the long run.

To make this problem even worse, it is possible that the gateway between the IP and the PSTN world needs access to the valid numbers as well. Potentially, this implies a third database with valid numbers, making the administration of telephony accounts (e.g., creating a new account or moving one account from legacy telephony to IP Telephony) a tough job.

#### 4.1.3.2 Decentralisation

Another issue occurs regarding the question of who is allowed to administer what in the telephone system. In classic environments, there is a small group of PBX administrators that sits in a special location, but in the network world, at least on campuses, often consists of locally-administrated networks.

When introducing IP Telephony, there is the chance, or pitfall, depending on your point of view, to apply the structures from the network world to the telephony world. For instance, consider an IP Telephony infrastructure of a university that gives every student a telephony account. At the start of the semester, several hundred new accounts must be created. To reduce the workload, this could be delegated to administrators of the different departments. Or, consider a research staff member that moves from one office to another, which might require a configuration change when using port-based authentication. It would be fine if these changes could be decentralised.
Decentralised administration does not necessarily mean that all administrators have the same permissions. An IP Telephony server might, for example, separate the permission to change account data from the permissions to view the call detail records.

Many available products allow remote administration through a Web interface which generally allows decentralised administration. Whether different administration permissions can be granted heavily depends heavily on the products used.

### 4.2 Dial plans

The previous sections already addressed issues regarding the dial plan that is used. There is no ideal solution to address all different needs but there are a number of techniques to solve specific needs. This section addresses the most common problems faced when dealing with dial plans.

1. **IP Telephony numberblocks**

   Usually, there is an already existing PBX dial plan and IP Telephony is to be integrated into this dial plan. If the existing dial plan has a free numberblock, then the first approach would be to give IP Telephony the whole block. This makes the configuration very simple because it allows prefix-based routing (see Section 4.1.1.1.1). The problem is that either only new telephone users get an IP telephone or that every user who wants to use IP Telephony gets a new phone number. So this approach is not suitable for a seamless migration towards IP Telephony.

2. **IP Telephony service prefix**

   Another solution is to define a prefix that has to be dialled to reach an IP telephone. As mentioned before, prefix-routing is the easiest option to configure. An IP Telephony prefix would also allow a user to change from a legacy phone to an IP Telephony phone but keep his number modified in a way that is easy to remember (e.g., if the internal number was 2972 and the prefix for VoIP is 99 than the new number is 992972, which applies for all numbers).

   On the other hand, there must be a way to decide if a call that originates on the IP-side has an IP Telephony target or a phone on the PBX. Again, this can be realised with a service prefix for legacy phones or by making the PBX the default route for targets that are not registered at the same server. This must be carefully considered to avoid the situation that a call from an IP phone to another IP phone target that is not currently registered is routed back and forth between IP Telephony server and PBX.

   The problem with this solution is that you have to know if the person you want to call has an IP phone or not and this constitutes a number change which still requires all business cards to be reprinted.

   To avoid this number change being ‘visible’, the PBX might set up a mapping table that maps outdated old addresses to the new addresses, so the PBX maps the dialled 2972 to 992972 and routes the call to the IP world.
3. Per-number routing
The cleanest way to handle call routing is to perform routing decisions on the individual number (see Section 4.1.1.1.2). Whether a number belongs to an IP phone or PBX phone is fully transparent to the user and no error-prone default routes are required. It is also the solution that has the highest configuration and administration effort because there are, most probably, at least two databases that must be kept consistent.

4. Protocol- and number-based routing
The call routing problem gets worse as soon as multiple call-signalling protocols are deployed in the IP world and there is no single server supporting all of them at once (see Figure 4.5). Every IP Telephony server must be aware that a number that belongs to another server must be routed to the gateway, or otherwise the gateway must be the default route for unknown targets. In any case, calls for unknown targets land on a gateway. The gateway needs to decide where to route a call. Because it is desirable that gateways are dumb (to prevent having yet another place to configure routing details), the gateway will hand the call to the PBX which makes the final routing decision, which eventually means to hand the call to another gateway (or back to the originating server if there is only one multi-protocol gateway).

All of the problems and solutions mentioned above are very dependent on specific products and the features they support, so, unfortunately, there can be no general advice on how to implement dial plan migration.

≈ 4.3 Authentication
To charge individuals for used services, it is necessary to have means of authentication for registration and call signalling. This section gives an overview of the mechanisms used for this purpose in H.323 and SIP.

≈ 4.3.1 Authentication in H.323
The H.323 protocol framework uses H.235 Security and Encryption for H-series (H.323 and other H.245-based) multimedia terminals for optional security features. This recommendation describes how to incorporate authentication, integrity and confidentiality for H.323 communication and what kind of security infrastructure and techniques are supported.

≈ 4.3.1.1 Areas of application
H.235 can be applied to all aspects of H.323 communication, which can be broken into two basic categories: Security for signalling messages and Security for media streams.

Security for signalling messages includes the RAS channel (see Section 2.2.1.3) that is used for registration of endpoints, admission and status of calls, as well as the call signalling channel (H.225) that is used for call establishment and the media control channel (H.245).

Security for media streams is used to provide confidentiality for transmitted audio and video data.
4.3.2 User Authentication

User authentication is the process by which a user performing an action proves his identity to the server entity. Basically, three different approaches can be classified: passwords with symmetric encryption, passwords with hashing and public-key mechanisms.

1. Passwords with symmetric encryption: This approach is based on the idea that both communicating entities share a secret, e.g., a password and that each endpoint has a unique generalID that has been configured before by some means outside the protocol and that is known to both endpoints.

The endpoint that wishes to be authenticated generates a CryptoToken which consists of the sender's generalID, the receiver's generalID, a timestamp and a random number (that is monotonically increasing, making messages with the same timestamp unique) encoded with the secret key (derived from the shared password).

Encryption can be done by a selection of mechanisms such as DES, 3-DES or any other algorithm that is registered in ISO/IEC 9979. It is also possible that a manufacturer can use other algorithms although this will not be interoperable.

2. Passwords with hashing: this is a similar approach, where CryptoHashedToken is computed using the generalID and a timestamp to be passed through a hashing function like HMAC-MD5 or algorithms defined in ISO/IEC 9797.

3. Public-key mechanisms: this approach also generates a CryptoToken but uses asymmetric encryption. This enables the use of signature cards and certificates.

4.3.3 Integrity

Integrity refers to message integrity and ensures that a received message is identical to that which was transmitted by the sender and has not been modified.

H.235 supports two mechanisms to achieve integrity: the use of CryptoTokens and the IntegrityCheckValue.

1. CryptoTokens are already described in Section 4.3.2. To allow an integrity check, the whole message is used to compute a MAC/digital signature, instead of just a small subset required for authentication.

This mechanism can be used for any signalling channel (RAS/H.225.0/H.245).

2. IntegrityCheckValue refers to an element that occurs in RAS messages. Again, the hash-value of the message (without the hash-value) is transmitted.

This second mechanism was introduced before the adoption of H.235, because it was deemed critical that there was not a data-integrity mechanism for the unreliable RAS channel. Since the adoption of H.235, the CryptoToken method is the preferred way to check integrity.

2. An unofficial list can be found at: <http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~cjm/ISO-register/>
4.3.1.4 Confidentiality

Confidentiality ranges from secured H.225.0 signalling channels to secured media streams. The H.323/H.235 suite of protocols does not specify a way to secure the signalling channels, because they are used first in every call but have to be secured from the very beginning. Instead, Transport Layer Security (TLS) or IPSEC is be used to secure the H.225.0 channel. An endpoint supporting such a mechanism must listen on a well-known port (e.g., 1300 for TLS) to receive secured connections.

Within H.225.0, the security capabilities for the H.245 media control channel can be exchanged. The H.245 channel itself can be used to negotiate media encryption.

4.3.1.5 Security profiles

H.235 defines three security profiles, - the ‘Baseline security profile’, the ‘Signature security profile’ and the ‘Voice encryption security profile’. Each profile defines a collection of H.235 mechanisms that must be supported by an endpoint.

The Baseline security profile is the simplest profile and is suitable for providing authentication and integrity in password-based environments. Most endpoints that claim H.235 support implement (only) this profile.

The Signature security profile is the same as the Baseline security profile but uses digital signatures instead of passwords.

The Voice encryption security profile defines mechanisms to achieve confidentiality for the media streams. It can be used along with one of the other security profiles that achieve authentication.

4.3.1.6 H.235 and the real world

While H.235 has existed for some years, there are not many H.323 products that support it. Some products only use H.235 (baseline security) for the communication between gatekeeper and gateway and not for communication with the endpoint. And even in cases where endpoint communication uses H.235, it is often not interoperable between different vendor products because H.235 does not mandate a minimum set of algorithms that can be used, or which elements, the generated tokens must consist of. So, when interested in H.235 in your IP Telephony network, ask your IP Telephony vendor for a list of compatible equipment.

4.3.2 Authentication in SIP

This section describes authentication mechanisms used in SIP-based networks. First the basics of digest authentication are described, while in following sections a brief overview is given of how digest authentication applies to SIP messages, when it should be used and when it should not.
~ 4.3.2.1 Overview of Digest Authentication

Digest authentication is a simple authentication mechanism developed originally for HTTP (it is often called HTTP digest) and it is described in RFC2671. The authentication mechanism is very simple. It is based on cryptographic hashes to prevent the transferring of the user's password in clear-text.

Digest authentication verifies that both parties that communicate know a shared secret (a password).

When a server wants to authenticate a user, it generates digest challenge and sends it to the user. A typical digest challenge looks like this:

```
Digest realm="iptel.org", qop="auth,auth-int",
nonce="dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bfb0c093", opaque="", algorithm=MD5
```

It consists of a set of parameters that are sent to the user. The user then uses the parameters to generate the proper digest reply and send it back to the server. The meaning of the parameters in the digest challenge is as follows:

- **realm**: The realm parameter is mandatory and must be present in all challenges. Its purpose is to identify credentials within a SIP message. In the case of SIP, it is usually set to the domain that the proxy server is responsible for.

  SIP user agents are supposed to display the contents of the parameter to the user when they prompt him for username and password so that he uses the appropriate username and password (for this server);

- **nonce**: this is a server-specified data string which is uniquely generated each time a server generates a digest challenge. Nonce is usually constructed as the MD5 hash of some data. The data usually includes time-stamp and a secret phrase of the generating server. That ensures that each nonce has a limited lifetime (i.e., expires after some time and can not be used later) and also is unique (i.e., no other server will be able to generate the same nonce).

  Clients use the nonce to generate a digest response and thus the server will receive the contents of the nonce back in a digest response. It usually checks the validity of the nonce before it checks the rest of the digest response.

  So, basically, nonce is a sort of an identifier that ensures that received digest credentials have really been generated for a particular digest challenge, and also limits the lifetime of the digest response, preventing replay attacks in the future;

- **opaque**: this is an opaque data string passed to the user in a challenge. The user will pass the data string back to the server in a digest response. That allows servers to be stateless. If there is any state they need to maintain between challenge and response, they can pass it to the client using this parameter and read it again later when a digest response comes.

- **algorithm**: the algorithm used to calculate hashes. Currently only MD5 is supported;

- **qop**: the quality of protection. The parameter specifies what protection schemes the server supports. A client will pick one from the list. The value ‘auth’ indicates just authentication.
The value 'auth-int' indicates authentication with some integrity protection. For a more detailed description, see RFC2617.

After receiving the digest challenge, a user agent will prompt the user for username and password (if not preconfigured), generate a digest response and send the response to the server. A digest response might look like this:

```
Digest username="jan", realm="iptel.org",
    nonce="dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bf0c093", uri="sip:iptel.org",
    qop=auth, nc=00000001, cnonce="0a4f113b",
    response="6629fae49393a05397450978507c4ef1", opaque=""
```

The digest response is similar to the digest challenge. Those parameters that are the same have the same meaning as in the digest challenge. Below is a brief description of only the new parameters:

- **uri**: the parameter contains URI the clients wants to access;
- **qop**: the level of protection chosen by the client;
- **nc**: (nonce count) the value is the hexadecimal count of the number of requests (including the current request) that the client has sent with the nonce value in this request. For example, in the first request, sent in response to a given nonce value, the client sends $nc=00000001$. The purpose of this directive is to allow the server to detect request replays by maintaining its own copy of this count. If the same value is seen twice, then the request is a replay;
- **cnonce**: the value is an opaque quoted string value provided by the client and used by both client and server to avoid chosen plain-text attacks, to provide mutual authentication and to provide some message integrity protection;
- **response**: a string computed by the user agent which proves that the user knows a password.

Upon reception of a digest response, the server recalculates the value of the response parameter for comparison purposes, using attributes provided by the client and the password stored on the server. If the result is identical to the response received from the client, then the client has proven knowledge of the password and he is authenticated.

### 4.3.2.2 Digest Authentication and SIP

The appearance of digest challenge and response has been described, but not yet how they are applied to SIP messages. Since the authentication mechanism was originally developed for the HTTP protocol, and SIP is very similar to that protocol, mapping of digest challenge and response to SIP messages is easy and straightforward. It is described in RFC3261.

When a SIP server receives a SIP request and wants to verify the authenticity of the user before processing the requests, it looks to see if the request contains digest credentials. If there are no credentials in the SIP request, it will generate a negative final response and include digest challenge into the response.

When a client receives the response (containing digest challenge), it is supposed to calculate proper digest response and send the request again, this time including the calculated digest credentials.
The server then verifies the digest response and processes the request if the verification was successful.

Proxy servers use the **Proxy Authentication Required** response and include the digest challenge into the **Proxy-Authenticate** header field. An example of such a challenge might look like:

```plaintext
SIP/2.0 407 Proxy Authentication Required.
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 195.37.78.121:5060.
From: sip:jan@iptel.org;tag=3944790419.
To: <sip:5060@iptel.org;user=phone>;tag=794fe65c16edf45da4fc39a5d2867
Call-ID: 3541699089@195.37.78.121.
CSeq: 1 INVITE.
Proxy-Authenticate: Digest realm="iptel.org", nonce="3f9fc19cf91f65958f664122c1310d4c28cc61a2".
Content-Length: 0.
```

SIP user agents (including registrars and back-to-back user agents) use the **401 Unauthorised** response for the digest challenge. An example of such a challenge might be:

```plaintext
SIP/2.0 401 Unauthorised.
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 218.79.100.193:65030;branch=z9hG4bK1ce21dab.
To: "IPTel844978" <sip:844978@iptel.org>;tag=794fe65c16edf45da4fc39
From: "IPTel844978" <sip:844978@iptel.org>;tag=1fd6218e.
Call-ID: 2d471abf-c0fbee95-bee3355-fea1736b@218.79.100.193.
CSeq: 88608141 REGISTER.
WWW-Authenticate: Digest realm="iptel.org", nonce="3f9fc19cf91f65958f664122c1310d4c28cc61a2".
Content-Length: 0.
```

407 responses are used by SIP elements (mostly SIP Proxy Servers) that are not the final destination for the request, and after authentication, will forward the requests further. 401 responses are used by SIP elements that are the final destination for the request and after authentication will generate a final reply.

When including the digest response clients add an **Authorisation** or a **Proxy-Authorisation** header field that contains the digest response. The following example shows a REGISTER message containing digest credentials.

```plaintext
REGISTER sip:iptel.org SIP/2.0.
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 195.37.78.121:5060.
From: sip:jan@iptel.org.
To: sip:jan@iptel.org.
Call-ID: 003094c3-bcfe355-f6577140@195.37.78.121.
CSeq: 102 REGISTER.
Contact: <sip:jan@195.37.78.121:5060>.
Authorisation: Digest username="jan",realm="iptel.org",
4.3.2.3 Basic Scenarios

Above is a description of what digest authentication looks like and how digest challenges and responses are carried in SIP messages. This chapter looks at which SIP messages can be challenged and which cannot. It also describes the two most common situations in which digest authentication is used.

When a SIP user agent receives a digest challenge, it is supposed to re-send the same request again, but this time with proper digest credentials. That also means that the user agent must increase the CSeq number in the request in order to avoid treatment the new request as a retransmission by the server.

Because challenging a request means that the request will be sent again with higher CSeq. It is not possible to challenge ACK and CANCEL requests. Both the requests must have the same CSeq as the original request and thus can not be challenged.

All other requests can be challenged, although from time-to-time there appear implementations that seem to have problems with the challenging of the not-so-common SIP requests.

There are two cases which are deployed most often and deserve further description: authentication of REGISTER messages and authentication of INVITE messages. These are described in separate sections.

4.3.2.3.1 Registration authentication

Authentication of REGISTER messages is very important and should be done by every SIP Proxy Server. By REGISTER messages, SIP user agents are informing the server of their current location so the server knows where to send further requests.

If a server does not authenticate REGISTER requests then anyone can register any contact for any user, thus hijacking calls to that person. This is obviously extremely important to protect against, and therefore authentication of REGISTER messages should always be enabled.

Figure 4.9 shows the call flow of a typical SIP registration including digest authentication.
4.3.2.3.2 Invite authentication

Authentication of INVITE requests is not really required, but it is a good practice to do so. A SIP Proxy Server can only challenge requests that are coming from users belonging to an administrative domain that the proxy server is responsible for. This means that a proxy responsible for, e.g., the iptel.org domain can challenge only requests that have iptel.org in the From header field.

Requests coming from foreign users cannot be challenged because foreign users usually do not have a username and password registered at this server. Requiring authentication would make incoming calls from foreign users impossible.

Figure 4.10 is a call flow of challenged INVITE.
~ 4.4. Examples

This section lists some examples of how a zone setup could look like, depending on the requirements.

~ 4.4.1. Example 1: Simple use of IP Telephony like legacy telephony

**Assumption**: an institution currently using a PBX with internal numbers of four digits length. There are telephone numbers from 6000 to 6999 available for IP Telephony. There are no requirements regarding authentication. Because only calls into the PSTN will be billed, the PBX is the only place where billing will take place. There are no special requirements regarding availability and there is no demand for IP Telephony research.

**Components**: any kind of IP Telephony server (H.323 Gatekeeper or SIP Proxy), even productions using proprietary protocols are usable. The gateway must be able to translate signalling between the protocol that the server uses and the PBX. The protocol to the PBX usually uses one of the protocols described in Section 5.1.1.

**Structure**: See Figure 4.11.

**Call Routing**: the PBX is configured to route every call to a number, starting with 6, to the gateway. The IP Telephony server either has the gateway as a default route for unknown/unregistered targets or is configured to route every call to a number that does not start with 6 to the gateway too. The gateway can either be configured to always route a call from one side to the other or needs to have a configuration similar to the IP Telephony server.

**Authentication**: authentication on the IP-side is either done using the H.323 or SIP authentication mechanisms or can be done on the link layer. In the latter case, a telephone number is bound to a specific port or MAC address.

**Billing**: the billing mechanisms that were already in use for PBX calls can be used for IP Telephony as well as all outgoing calls passing the PBX.

---

Figure 4.11 Example of simple IP Telephony
The solution described allows an easy integration of IP Telephony into a PBX world. The advantage of this solution compared to just more legacy phones is that IP Telephony allows more flexibility regarding the endpoints, allowing both hard and software phones that may even be connected by wireless LAN (depending on the authentication mechanisms used).

The disadvantage of this solution is that it relies heavily on the PBX, which remains the core element of the infrastructure. If there is demand for more IP Telephony accounts, more numberblocks must be available. To free such a block requires giving legacy phone users new numbers. The solution also does not make use of the Internet for long-distance calls or select an IP Telephony service provider.

### 4.4.2 Example 2: An example of complex, full-featured IP Telephony

**Assumption:** a university with multiple locations, a shared, unstructured dialling space has a need for both SIP and H.323. It should be possible to test new IP Telephony server firmware before installing it in the production network. To stretch this idea further, an additional requirement is that the IP Telephony system has to be divided into three logical networks: a production network (the telephone system for 90% of all employees), a testing network to run new firmware versions before deploying them in the production network, and a research network for IP Telephony-related research work. Obviously, the networks differ in reliability, having high reliability requirements in the production network and nearly none in the research network.

A daring user might decide to participate in the testing network without changing his phone number or using a second phone.

**Components:** to be able to do IP Telephony research on standardised protocols, the research network runs either an H.323 Gatekeeper or a SIP Proxy. The production network runs a redundant server that supports H.323 as well as SIP. The testing network uses the same server model, without redundancy. A RADIUS server stores all valid users (names and numbers) along with their password. The billing records can be written by the PBX and the IP Telephony server, e.g., using a SQL server.

**Structure:** Figure 4.12 describes how the servers are organised. There is an H.323 Gatekeeper or SIP Proxy for each logical network. Which logical network an endpoint belongs to is simply defined by which server it is registered with, and is independent from the physical network structure. To participate in testing of new features, the endpoint of the user need only be configured to register on the server using the new firmware version.

**Call Routing:** routing decisions are either made using a shared database (see Section 4.1.1.1.3) or by routing calls to external targets, via the server in the production network, to the PBX gateway. A server, whose user dials an internal number, tries other locally-registered endpoints first, before asking the peer server using the LRQ mechanism of H.323.

**Authentication:** to achieve authentication, the mechanisms described in Section 4.3 are used. The authentication back-end is provided by a RADIUS server that stores logins and passwords.
Billing: because external calls are routed through the PBX, the existing billing solution may be used. If the production network gatekeeper is able to write billing records as well, it will become the production billing server when, sometime in the future, the university selects an IP Telephony provider instead of a PSTN Telco.

Figure 4.12 Example of a multi-server IP Telephony zone

This scenario is quite complex, but it is the most flexible. It allows individual users to move from the legacy telephony world to IP Telephony, eventually reducing the PBX to a minimal state. It is made robust by using redundant servers where necessary. Because routing decisions are made on the IP-side, this solution qualifies for communication with external targets via the Internet or through use of an IP Telephony provider. The decision for open standards (SIP, H.323) allows space for research initiatives and prevents dependency on specific vendors.

All these possibilities come at a price. Several servers must be bought and the complex structure makes it harder to trace errors.

~ 4.5 Setting up H.323 services

When setting up H.323 services, the basic component to install is a gatekeeper, in order to provide initial functionality to an installed base of H.323 clients. This basic functionality entails:
- in-zone calling among endpoints;
- out-of-zone calling (incoming/outgoing);
- access to local services (e.g., gateways, multi-point conference servers);
- name resolution during calls, by H.323 alias or E.164 number;
- zone management (authentication, bandwidth restriction, etc.).

In this section, guides will be presented for running the three most popular gatekeeper implementations that are available today. A comparison of these gatekeeper implementations, based on their capabilities and requirements, follows here:
Figure 4.13 Examples of gatekeeper features

Guides for basic operation of the above three gatekeepers follow, but official documentation for these products should be consulted when advanced functionality and features are required.

~ 4.5.1 Using a Cisco Multimedia Conference Manager (MCM Gatekeeper)

The Cisco MCM is a software gatekeeper that runs only on Cisco router hardware with special IOS images (H.323 feature set). One the one hand, this makes it easy to find a hardware platform for running it within most organisations that use Cisco hardware, without regard for underlying operating system support. On the other hand, it does not allow the flexibility of installation on any available PC-based server. It is a commercial-grade implementation, mostly geared towards VoIP gateway services and less towards an open H.323 community of endpoints that possibly spans organisational borders. The MCM supports either direct mode dialling, or full routing mode, through the use of an included H.323 proxy server. Multiple H.323 zones can be configured and controlled on one MCM installation, but only in combination with subnet restriction rules for groups of endpoints. The MCM has good inter-zone routing features with DNS gatekeeper discovery as extra and performs well in a homogeneous Cisco environment, but has only basic support for RADIUS-based authentication (by H.323 alias or E.164 and proprietary piggy-back password mechanism) and no support for LDAP H.350 authentication. Cisco MCMVC: Configuring H.323 Gatekeepers is online.3

~ 4.5.1.1. Installation

Since the Cisco MCM Gatekeeper is only an IOS feature (IOS being the Cisco router operating system), basic IOS installation procedures are sufficient, assuming a correct IOS image with MCM functionality has been chosen from the Cisco support site. Two tools can help you choose an appropriate IOS for your available router, but they are only available to registered users on the Cisco Website:
- Cisco IOS Upgrade Planner
- Cisco Software Advisor.

Look for ‘High-Performance Gatekeeper’ under features and for ‘IP/H.323’ under feature sets. IOS versioning is a subject difficult to follow. Add to this the fact, that the MCM has been

undergoing changes during IOS development and gatekeeper features available on different IOS versions vary significantly. Finding the right IOS-MCM combination to use for a specific hardware configuration can become time consuming. Always prefer the latest available IOS release for your hardware, assuming enough RAM is available to accommodate it.

### 4.5.1.2 Configuration

Working with the Cisco IOS command line interface requires some experience with basic commands, modes of operation, loading software images and configuration files, none of which will be described here in detail. If you are not familiar with Cisco IOS basic commands, make sure you read an introductory guide by Cisco. To configure the Cisco MCM, you must establish command line access (telnet) to the router that runs the ‘IP/H.323’ feature set and enter privileged (enable command) mode, indicated by the # at the prompt, before you can enter configuration commands. Enter configuration mode (`config` command) and then specify the ‘gatekeeper’ section. In this section, you will need to enter the MCM configuration commands, as in the sample below, which merely initialises the gatekeeper operation:

```
> config
Configuring from terminal, memory, or network [terminal]?
Enter configuration commands, one per line. End with CNTL/Z.
```

```
> config-gk
> zone local gkp.mydomain.org mydomain.org
> no shutdown
> ^Z
```

The above sample is sufficient to start gatekeeper services on the router, but a more detailed configuration with comments for a basic gatekeeper set-up follows. We have dropped the command line prompt for simplicity. The following commands can be typed at the configuration interface, as shown above. Note that all user-specified fields are indicated as enclosed in brackets and you must customise/replace them appropriately for your site.

This section goes outside the gatekeeper configuration section as it relates to general AAA settings and RADIUS server communication. H.323 endpoint RAS registration will be checked against local IOS usernames first and then RADIUS-defined usernames. Accounting records will be sent to the RADIUS server.

```
!  
aaa new-model
aaa authentication login h323 local group radius
aaa accounting connection h323 start-stop group radius
!
radius-server host [radius.mydomain.org] auth-port [1812] acct-port [1813]
radius-server key [radius-server-key-as-defined-in-radius-host]
radius-server authorisation permit missing Service-Type
!  
```
! Gatekeeper section

gatekeeper

! Local zone info, as controlled by this gatekeeper
! The zone name "myzone" is for config purposes only and plays no role,
! while the domain is important for endpoints registering by e-mail alias,
! as endpoints that request to be registered by e-mail address must match
! the specified "mydomain.org" part.
! The zone prefix is important for recognising
! in-zone calls and endpoints, e.g anything beginning with 0030234
!
zone local [myzone] [mydomain.org]
zzone prefix [myzone] [0030234*]

To set up connectivity with other zones and gatekeepers, specify the IP of the neighbouring
gatekeeper with a 'zone remote' and the prefix it services with a 'zone prefix' for that zone.
For example, if you know a neighbour gatekeeper handles all calls with prefix 0030248, include
the following two lines.
!
zone remote [neighb1] [neighb1-domain.com] [neighb1-gkp-ip] 1719
zone prefix [neighb1] [0030248*]

The VideNet Gatekeeper, for example, is the largest global network of H.323 zones, to which you
can connect as shown below. Any calls beginning with 00, are routed to the VideNet Gatekeeper.
In order to accept calls from VideNet as well, you have to make your gatekeeper well known to
the VideNet hierarchy of gatekeepers (see https://videnet.unc.edu/)
!
zone remote videnet3 videnet 137.44.172.248 1719
zone prefix videnet3 00*
lrq forward-queries add-hop-count

To force endpoints to register with a specific h323-id and password you can use H.235
(few endpoints support it) or the h323-id/password mechanism that the MCM provides.
!
accounting
security h323-id
security password separator /

Make sure no H.323 proxy services are unintentionally used, unless proxy functionality is needed
for security or QoS reasons.
!
no use-proxy [myzone] default inbound-to terminal
no use-proxy [myzone] default outbound-from terminal
4.5.1.3 Operation

Immediately after configuration, the MCM may service endpoints, and you can verify this by making a couple of endpoints point to the gatekeeper for registration. As soon as the endpoints register, they can be listed with the following command:

- **show gatekeeper endpoints**
  You may proceed with calling between the two endpoints by dialling from the one the registered aliases (name or number) of the other. The ongoing call can be listed with the following command:

- **show h323 gatekeeper calls**
  As an administrator of the gatekeeper, you may disconnect the call, or even unregister an endpoint.

- **clear gatekeeper call call-id . . .**
- **unregister . . .**
  A view of the operational status of the gatekeeper, such as zones defined, endpoints registered, neighbour gatekeepers defined etc. may be displayed by the following command:

- **show gatekeeper status**
  Debug logs of the gatekeeper operations may be monitored with the following sequence of commands:

  ```
  terminal monitor
debug gatekeeper main 10
debug h225 asn1
debug h245 asn1
  ```

  The first command makes your terminal capable of displaying console-style logs and debugging output. The second command produces debugging output regarding basic gatekeeper actions. Obviously, the last two commands display information on H.225 and H.245 protocols and the output can be overwhelming, but it may be the only debugging option when faced with an otherwise intractable problem. Each debugging option can be stopped by its equivalent **no debug** and all debugging output can be stopped with the **no debug all** command.

4.5.1.4 Endpoint authentication

The MCM Gatekeeper implements H.235 authentication, but its use is limited to gatekeeper-to-gatekeeper and gatekeeper-to-gateway authentication, because of the very limited deployment of H.235 capable endpoints. Cisco has implemented an alternative method for endpoint authentication, which allows for an H.323 or E.164 alias to carry (piggy-back) both alias information and a password, separated by an administrator-defined special character, for example, a configuration for this feature is provided above and once activated, endpoints must be configured to use alias/password combinations to register with the gatekeeper. There are
shortcomings to this method that stem mostly from the fact that it is a proprietary solution, which, in some cases, exposes clear text passwords to neighbouring devices (MCUs, gateways, gatekeepers). Of course, the MCM includes RADIUS support, which might allow for an IP address + alias identification method to be implemented on the RADIUS server side, but such a solution imposes restrictions to endpoint mobility.

~ 4.5.1.5 Advanced features

The Cisco MCM supports RADIUS authentication and accounting to a remote RADIUS server. With the extensive support of RADIUS servers to a number of back-ends, such as databases and directory services, this can be an important feature when seeking a method of integrating H.323 access control with already deployed services (e.g., dial-up, LDAP), or a simple way of storing call-accounting information in a database. Also, the exchange of standard and vendor-specific attributes during the RADIUS negotiation process allows very fine control of some delicate parameters, such as call duration, which would otherwise be inaccessible to an external-to-the-gatekeeper application. Of course, only experienced RADIUS administrators and middleware developers can exploit the full potential of the RADIUS configuration files and its back-end interfaces. The Cisco MCM supports an alternative method to neighbour-discovery than static neighbour entries in the IOS configuration. A DNS-based gatekeeper discovery mechanism is in place that allows the MCM to find gatekeepers responsible for a specific domain by checking for the existence of a TXT record in the domain's DNS zone information. This can be useful if a large community of users in separate zones employs e-mail addresses for dialling. The gatekeepers serving them do not need to have static knowledge of each other, but can discover destination gatekeepers responsible for a domain through DNS. Multiple zone support is implemented on the MCM in a way that allows multiple instances of the gatekeeper to run within one router. This would have been an excellent feature, if it could have avoided a major handicap: endpoint registration to a specific gatekeeper has to be guided by administratively preset IP address subnet restrictions. Interestingly enough, Cisco gateways can utilise this functionality by indicating on their RRQ messages (by gatekeeper ID and not by IP address) which gatekeeper they request to be registered with.

~ 4.5.2 Using a RADVISION Enhanced Communication Server (ECS Gatekeeper)

The RASVISION ECS is a software-only gatekeeper that runs on the WinNT or Win2000 operating systems, a fact that ties it to specific remote management techniques used with all other Windows-based servers. It is a commercial-grade implementation and it is considered top-of-the-line for the features it provides and its compatibility even with the latest H.323 specifications. It is servicing large organisations with a great number of endpoints and most notably, some of the VideNet global root gatekeepers. The ECS supports all three modes of routing: direct, Q.931 routing and both Q.931 and H.245 routing. The ECS has good inter-zone routing features with DNS gatekeeper discovery and neighbour gatekeeper LDAP support as extra. Authentication is very flexible, with the ability for ‘predefined’ endpoint settings enforced at registration time and LDAP H.350 support, but no RADIUS support.
### 4.5.2.1 Installation

Installing the ECS Gatekeeper is a very simple task, since it involves merely the execution a GUI setup wizard, which requires no configuration options. The only potential source of installation problems lies with the fact that the Windows SNMP service must already be installed, before any service packs and the ECS installer are applied. If this advice, which is listed in the ECS documentation, is ignored, the ECS installer refuses to proceed and the only option is to reinstall the operating system itself.

Also, the administrator of the host must make sure that port 80 is free, since the ECS installs an HTTP service on this default port for configuration management over a Web interface. The documentation also calls for an FTP server to be running at the same host, but it only serves for downloading ECS log files, which is not a required functionality.

### 4.5.2.2 Configuration

Once installed, the ECS is ready to run with default configuration options. The administrator can access the management interface (see Figure 4.14) by launching a browser and requesting the local Web server (http://localhost). The interface presents a login page, where the default username and password can be entered (admin/null-no-password). After successful login, the administrator is made aware of the fact that the management tool can supervise the operation of a whole hierarchy of ECS Gatekeepers (Global picture), as well as the single ECS installation residing on this host (Local picture). Proceed with the **Local administrator** interface.

![Figure 4.14 ECS local administration entry](image)

Immediately afterwards, the menus for the administration of the locally-installed gatekeeper are shown, as below.

There are four commands to allow configuration management. The **Refresh** button fills in the Web interface forms with configuration data from the currently-running ECS Gatekeeper configuration. The **Upload** button takes all the changes made on the Web interface and applies them to the currently-running ECS configuration. The **Import** and **Export** buttons are used to store and retrieve snapshots of the configuration at different points in time.
The rest of the interface is fairly straightforward, with an array of configuration tabs (sections), the most important of which are listed below:

- **Status** tab: allows view of the current status of the gatekeeper by indicating the number of ongoing calls and registered endpoints, as well as bandwidth usage statistics for in-zone and out-of-zone calls;
- **Settings** tab: this is where most of the configuration options are specified, logically separated into a series of thematic categories (Basics, Calls, Dial Plan, Supplementary Services, Logs, LDAP, DNS, Security, Alternate Gatekeeper, Advanced);
- **Endpoints** tab: allows view and control of the currently-registered endpoints with details on their aliases (name and number), IP addresses and online time. This tab can be used to redefine endpoints, i.e. assign specific aliases to endpoints that may later be used for endpoint identification during authentication;
- **Services** tab: allows view and configuration of the currently declared services. By default, four services exist at installation time and they are not activated, since their prefix setting is null. Therefore they merely exist as templates for defining basic services functionality;
- **Call Control** tab: allows view and control of the calls in progress and the setting up of gatekeeper-initiated calls between arbitrary endpoints, with the **Make call** option, assuming the gatekeeper runs in fully-routed mode (see the **Signalling Models** Section and the **Settings** tab, category **Calls** in the ECS interface);
- **Forwarding** tab: allows set-up of forwarding rules based on source and destination, for three cases: forward on busy, forward on no answer, unconditional forward;
- **Hierarchy** tab: allows set-up of a parent gatekeeper in order to forward **Location Requests** for cases of unresolved destinations. User-assigned filters may also be applied to specify and control the extent of the cases referred upstream to the parent gatekeeper.
Even though the ECS Gatekeeper runs out-of-the-box, you may want to inspect some of its basic settings and decide whether they fit the needs of your application. There are three tabs that should be, at least browsed, through before proceeding with operation.

Under Settings tab, in the category Basic, make a note of the name of the gatekeeper (gatekeeper ID). Also, be aware of the setting who can register, where the choices are everyone for no authentication control, predefined endpoints only for some authentication control and no endpoints to turn down all endpoints for maintenance reasons only. The choice between ‘dial plan v.1’ and ‘dial plan v.2’ may not be obvious, but keep in mind that the second option allows more flexibility in hierarchically connected gatekeeper environments. Once chosen, it dynamically enables extra configuration sections. The option for DHCP environment may be used for authentication control, as it instructs the gatekeeper to identify endpoints by previously seen IP addresses and H.323 aliases (names) and authenticate them, based on this information. The last choice, merge predefined and on-line aliases upon registration is an interesting feature, because it allows the gatekeeper to apply extra aliases to well-known and identified endpoints, e.g., an endpoint may register with a name alias only, but the gatekeeper will attach an E.164 number to this endpoint as well.

Under the Settings tab, in the category Calls, be aware of the routing mode selection, as it alter the operation of the gatekeeper dramatically. Direct mode employs minimal communication between endpoints and gatekeeper (RAS messages only), while Call set-up routing mode forces call set-up messages to be routed through the gatekeeper as well (Q.931). The third mode forces all previous messages, as well as call control messages, to be routed through the gatekeeper and not directly between the endpoints. The setting of accept calls can be used for maintenance reasons to turn off all calling between endpoints.

Under the Settings tab, in the category Dialplan, assuming you have chosen dial plan version 2, you will be able to specify the stripping of zone prefixes from destination information of incoming calls. This feature may allow a more user-friendly dial plan, where in-zone endpoints use shorter dial numbers for dialling and out-of-zone endpoints use full-length dial numbers.

In passing, check the category Logs if you would like to enable logging for debugging purposes, and the category Billing to enable usage statistics and accounting. Category DNS will allow discovery of neighbouring gatekeepers through specially crafted DNS TXT records, but it seems to be compatible only with other RADVISION gatekeepers. Category LDAP will allow endpoint alias data and neighbour data to be retrieved from LDAP directory services, as well as LDAP-enabled endpoint authentication.

**4.5.2.3 Operation**

Immediately after installation, the ECS may service endpoints, and you can verify this by making a couple of endpoints point to the gatekeeper for registration. As soon as the endpoints register, they appear at the Endpoints tab. You may proceed with calling between the two endpoints by dialling from one of the registered aliases (name or number) to the other. The ongoing call will appear in the Call Control tab. As an administrator of the gatekeeper, you may disconnect the call, or even un-register an endpoint from the respective tab sections. Logs of gatekeeper
operations may be started through the Settings tab, Logs subsection and can be inspected as text files from the C:\Program Files\Radvision\ECS\Gatekeeper\Logs directory where they are maintained and rotated after they reach a certain size.

### 4.5.2.4 Endpoint authentication

The ECS Gatekeeper implements H.235 authentication, but its use is limited to gatekeeper-to-gatekeeper and gatekeeper-to-gateway authentication, because of the very limited deployment of H.235 capable endpoints. The ECS implements a method of storing informational data for well-known endpoints (predefined endpoints). This feature allows for an IP address + alias identification method to be implemented, but such a solution imposes restrictions on endpoint mobility.

### 4.5.2.5 Advanced features

The ECS Gatekeeper is able to support hierarchies of gatekeepers (child-parent relationships) in cases where many levels of prefixes must be supported by prefix stripping or prefix substitution. For example, a country-level (parent) gatekeeper may need to know all dialled destinations by their 12-digit number, while an organisation-level (child) gatekeeper may be able to operate with just 4-digit numbers most of the time. In order for the child gatekeeper to support both long and short dial strings, it needs to implement prefix stripping.

The H.450 protocol provides the implementation framework for supporting, in H.323, a number of features common to conventional PBX systems. The ECS implements the H.450 protocol specifications, thus enabling many different types of forwarding: forward on busy, forward on no answer, forward on reject, etc. These features are supported only when the gatekeeper is in the full-routing mode (both call and control signal routing).

The ECS already has support for retrieving endpoint and neighbour data from LDAP, but it does so in a proprietary way. New developments in LDAP-enabled voice-over-IP services have given rise to H.350, the standardised protocol for storing and retrieving user settings and preferences regarding H.323 and SIP services. RADVISION is an active partner in the committee that developed the H.350 standard (previously known as H.LDAP or CommObject) and has made the commitment to implement it in the ECS Gatekeeper.

Until very recently, gatekeepers used to be single points of failure for voice-over-IP services, as endpoints in H.323 can only be registered with one gatekeeper. The ECS implements a special feature called ‘Alternate Gatekeeper’, where two identical ECS Gatekeepers on two different nodes can act in tandem, providing resilience in gatekeeper services transparently to the endpoints. This is achieved by constant exchange of information and status checking between a master and a slave gatekeeper, so that the second one can assume the role of the first in case of failure. In this case, some of the calls in progress may be disconnected, but at least redialling should be successful, without requiring the endpoints to register to a new gatekeeper.
4.5.3 Using an Open H.323 Gatekeeper - GNU Gatekeeper

The GNU GK is the most popular and active in the development of the open-source gatekeeper projects that stem from the OpenH323 project efforts. Being an open-source effort, it benefits from availability for many different operating systems and from flexibility in configuring a multitude of features and interfaces that are not usually available in commercial products, and all these with no licensing cost. At the same time, its initial installation is made problematic by lack of quality documentation and good versioning vs. feature-availability support, in contrast with a very active mailing list that users can seek help with. The GNU GK supports all three modes of routing: direct Q.931 routing and both Q.931 and H.245 routing. It has only basic inter-zone routing features, but authentication is very flexible, with very configurable RADIUS support and LDAP H.350 support in the works.

4.5.3.1 Installation

Installing the GNU GK Gatekeeper is not a simple task, if you decide to compile the source of the gatekeeper and the two libraries it requires. However, this may be your only option, if support of MySQL and LDAP is required, since the provided precompiled binaries are lacking it. To avoid compilation of the code, please refer to the Pre-Built binaries downloads at the end of this section. In order to compile and build the GNU GK you will need both the PWLib libraries (version 1.2 or later) and the OpenH323 libraries (version 1.8 or later). If you are not familiar with those libraries, please refer to their Web site on how to build them.

Recommended versions of the libraries are PWLib 1.4.11 or later and Openh323 1.11.7 or later. The order of compiling the packages is the following:

- PWLib (release + debug version);
- OpenH323;
- OpenH323 test application (not needed, just to make sure everything works so far);
- The GNU Gatekeeper itself;

To compile the GNU Gatekeeper on UNIX, do a `make debug` or `make opt` in the gatekeeper source directory to build debug or release versions, respectively. Use `make both` to build both versions. Note that you have to use GCC 2.95.2 or later. Good practice is to do a `make debugdepend` or `make optdepend` in the gatekeeper source directory before starting actual compilation (`make debug` or `make opt`). On Windows, just open and compile the provided project (gk.dsw) for Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0 or 7.0 (Visual C++ 5.0 is too old).

The gatekeeper supports MySQL and LDAP back-end interfaces (support for LDAP is still under development). The `make scripts` will look for the MySQL and OpenLDAP libraries in standard places, but if they are not found, you will have to explicitly point to their source directories by `config options`. If you do not want MySQL support, you may set the `NO_MYSQL` environment before making:
$ NO_MYSQL=1 make both
To leave out LDAP support:

$ NO_LDAP=1 make both
Or disable both with

$ NO_MYSQL=1 NO_LDAP=1 make both

For gatekeepers with a large numbers of concurrent calls, the GNU GK has implemented an extended `fd_set` structure that enables the gatekeeper to support thousands of concurrent calls in routed mode. To enable this feature, export the `LARGE_FDSET` environment variable to the maximum number of file descriptors. For example:

$ LARGE_FDSET=16384 make opt

The GNU GK includes implementation of a Radius protocol client that enables registration/admission authentication and authorisation using Radius servers. This feature is enabled by default. To disable compilation of these Radius modules, set the `NO_RADIUS` environment variable before making:

$ NO_RADIUS=1 make both

The GNU GK is able to do accounting. Currently, only RADIUS and plain text file accounting modules are available. The accounting is still considered an experimental feature, so it is not compiled in by default. To enable accounting, set the `HAS_ACCT` environment variable before making:

$ HAS_ACCT=1 make both

Moreover, there is no special installation procedure needed. After compilation, copy the executable to a directory of your choice and create a configuration file for it. There are several configuration examples in the `etc/` subdirectory of the source tree. See the next section on Configuration for further explanations.

For example, to start the gatekeeper, a command like this should work if the configuration file (`gnugk.ini`) is correct.

$ /usr/sbin/gnugk -c /etc/gnugk.ini -o /var/log/gnugk.log -ttt

If you do not wish to compile the gatekeeper from source, there are several pre-built binaries packages available. Not all versions will be made available as binaries. Therefore the reader will have to check what is available.

Regarding Red Hat packages, you will have to download the RPMs and enter the following command as root, substituting in the name of the file you wish downloaded.

$ rpm -Uvh gnugk-x.x.x.rpm
Regarding the Debian packages, you can install the gatekeeper by using the following command as root:

```
$ apt-get install openh323gk
```

### 4.5.3.2 Configuration

The behaviour of the gatekeeper is completely determined by the command line options at run time and the specified configuration file. Some command line options may override settings in the configuration file. In order to avoid confusion, it is common practice to keep all the configuration options in the configuration file and start the GNU GK with the following command:

```
$ [/usr/sbin/]gnugk -c /etc/gnugk.ini -o /var/log/gnugk.log -ttt
```

Here we provide a sample configuration file with the most important options for setting up basic services and their relative explanation. Note that all user-specified fields are indicated as beginning with 'my' and you must customise/replace them appropriately for your site.

```ini
# Two lines in order to be able to telnet your GK on a specific port
# (the default is port 7000)
# (the authorisation rules are detailed in the [GkStatus::Auth] section)
[Gatekeeper::Main]
Fourtytwo=42
# name of your GK
Name=my-GnuGK

# Network information
# Specify the network interfaces of the gatekeeper
# By default the gatekeeper will detect the interfaces
# of your host automatically
Home=my-ip-address

# Information about the parent GK in order to forward LRQ
# for out-of-zone calls
[RasSrv::Neighbors]
[neighbour-name]=my-ip-address:my-port;my-prefix-of-the-neighbor

# Define some features on LRQ and LCF
[RasSrv::LRQFeatures]
# The gatekeeper replies with LCFs containing
# the destinationInfo and destinationType fields,
# the registered aliases and the terminal type of the destination endpoint
# The neighbor gatekeeper can then save the information
# to suppress later LRQs
# However, some vendors' gatekeepers misuse the information,
# thus resulting in interoperability problems
# set it to 0 if you encounter problems with a third-party GK
```

---

P. 96
IncludeDestinationInfoInLCF=0
#Include a NonStandardParameter in LRQs
#to be compatible with Cisco gatekeepers
CiscoGKCompatible=1
#If hopCount has reached 0, the gatekeeper shall not forward the message
ForwardHopCount=10

#route mode section
[RoutedMode]
#Enable the gatekeeper routed mode, as opposed to the direct mode
GKRouted=1
#Route the H.245 control channel, only takes effect if GKRouted=1
H245Routed=1
#Some endpoints send h245Address in the UUIE of Q.931
#even when h245Tunnelling is set to TRUE
#This may cause interoperability problems, avoid setting this option to 1
RemoveH245AddressOnTunnelling=1
#The gatekeeper could tear down a call by sending
#RAS DisengageRequest to endpoints
#Some bad endpoints just ignore this command, with this option turned on,
#the gatekeeper will send
#Q.931 Release Complete instead of RAS DRQ to both endpoints
#to force them to drop the call
DropCallsByReleaseComplete=1
#Setting this parameter to 1 makes the gatekeeper
#to always send Release Complete to both endpoints
#before closing the call when it receives DRQ from one of the parties
SendReleaseCompleteOnDRQ=1

#Authorisation rules for telnet access to port
#(the default is port 7000)
[GkStatus::Auth]
#allow only specific addresses
rule=regex
# - we are allowing the IP addresses 192.168.1.*
regex=^(192\.[0-9]+)
default=forbid
#if you want to allow everybody, comment the previous lines and ...
#rule=allow

~ 4.5.3.3 Operation

There are a number of ways to monitor the operation of the GNU GK. A command-line (telnet) interface is provided, which is installed by default and allows monitoring of endpoints registrations and call requests. It also accepts unregistration commands for specific endpoints, call clearing and even reloading of the configuration file, having inserted the following lines in the configuration file:
we can telnet to the GNU GK machine on the port specified in the configuration file (the default is port 7000):

```bash
me@mypc> telnet gnugk-ip-address 7000
```

There are a number of commands that can be issued in this telnet session: type `help` to see a list of them. Most commands are easy and intuitive and there is no need to explain them further. To end the telnet session with the gatekeeper, type `quit` and hit `Enter`.

Moreover, there are two Graphical User Interface (GUI) front-ends for the gatekeeper in order to monitor and visualise the operations:
- Java GUI: This allows you to monitor the registrations and calls that go through the gatekeeper. A right-click on a button gives you a popup menu for each endpoint. This GUI works with Java 1.0 built into most Web browsers;
- GkGUI: A new standalone Java program. It requires Java 1.4. The GkGUI is released under GNU General Public License.

### 4.5.3.4 Endpoint authentication

The GNU Gatekeeper supports all three RADIUS, MySQL and LDAP back-end interfaces (LDAP is still under development) for registration (RRQ) and admission (ARQ) authentication and authorisation mechanisms. This is obviously a very complex as well as flexible environment in which to implement authentication and authorisation methods. H.235 is supported, but, more commonly, ad hoc authentication methods are used, such as the IP address + alias identification method on the RADIUS server side. Special credit-time or duration restricted calling applications can be deployed on the GNU GK, assuming sufficient administrator man/hours can be spared. Please refer to [Gatekeeper::Auth] and the following configuration sections on the manual Web page for a more detailed configuration descriptions of such features.

### 4.5.3.5 Advanced features

The GNU GK Gatekeeper incorporates an excellent combination of the features of the Cisco MCM and the RADVISION ECS, in a very flexible environment, being able to support hierarchies of gatekeepers (child-parent relationships) in cases where many levels of prefixes must be supported by prefix stripping or prefix substitution (please refer to the [Endpoint::RewriteE164] configuration section). Moreover the GNU GK implements resilience-features such as ‘Alternate Gatekeeper’ support (configuration available through the [Gatekeeper::Main] configuration section), where two identical GNU GK Gatekeepers on two different nodes can act in tandem, providing resilience in gatekeeper services transparently to the endpoints. Since it is an open-source project, its value per cost ratio is very high, but the command-line interfaces it provides are not for the faint-hearted and if you do make the choice,
be prepared to spend many hours over out-dated documentation and recompilations of new code-fixing releases.

~ 4.6 Setting up SIP services

~ 4.6.1 Operation of SIP Servers

~ 4.6.1.1 Recommended Operational Practices

Operation of a SIP server is not always an easy task. Server administrators face many challenges of broken or misconfigured user agents, network and host failures, hostile attacks and other stress-makers. All such situations may lead to an operational failure. It is sometimes very difficult to figure out the root reason of a failure, particularly in a distributed environment with many SIP components involved. In this section, we share some of our practices and refer to tools which have proven to make the life of administrators easier.

4.6.1.1.1 Message logging.

Frequently, operational errors are discovered or reported with a delay. Users frustrated by an error frequently approach administrators and scream “even though my SIP requests were absolutely OK yesterday, they were mistakenly denied by your server”. If administrators do not record all SIP traffic at their site, they will not be able to identify the reason for the problem. We recommend that site operators record all messages passing their site and keep them stored for some period of time. They may use utilities such as ngrep or tcpdump.

4.6.1.1.2 Real-time traffic watching.

Looking at SIP messages in real-time may help to gain understanding of problems. Though there are commercial tools available, using a simple, text-oriented tool such as ngrep is sufficient for the job, thanks to SIP's textual nature.

Example 4.1 Using ngrep

In this example, all messages at port 5060 which include the string bkraegelin are captured and displayed.

[jiri@fox s]$ ngrep bkraegelin@ port 5060
interface: eth0 (195.37.77.96/255.255.255.240)
filter: ip and ( port 5060 )
match: bkraegelin@
#
U +0.000000 153.96.14.162:50240 -> 195.37.77.101:5060
REGISTER sip:iptel.org SIP/2.0.
From: sip:bkraegelin@iptel.org.
To: sip:bkraegelin@iptel.org.
Call-ID: 0009b7aa-1249b554-6407d246-72d2450a@153.96.14.162.
Date: Thu, 26 Sep 2002 22:03:55 GMT.
CSeq: 101 REGISTER.
Expires: 10.
4.6.1.3. Tracing Errors in Server Chains.
A request may pass any number of proxy servers on its path to the destination. If an error occurs in the chain, it is difficult for upstream trouble-shooters and/or users complaining to administrators to learn more about error circumstances.

A nice utility for debugging server chains is sipsak, SIP Swiss Army Knife, a trace-route-like tool for SIP developed at iptel.org. It allows you to send an OPTIONS request with low, increasing \texttt{Max-Forwards} header-fields and follow how it propagates in the SIP network. See its \url{Webpage at http://sipsak.berlios.de/}.

Example 4.2 Use of sipsak for Learning SIP Path

```
[jiri@bat sipsak]$ ./sipsak -T -s sip:7271@iptel.org
warning: IP extract from warning activated to be more informational
0: 127.0.0.1 (0.456 ms) SIP/2.0 483 Too Many Hops without Contact header
1: ?? (31.657 ms) SIP/2.0 200 OK
```

Note that in this example, the second-hop server does not issue any warning header fields in replies and it is thus impossible to display its IP address in sipsak's output.

4.6.1.4 Server status monitoring.
It is essential for solid operation to monitor server status continuously. Two tools have been used for this purpose. Sipsak does a great job of ‘pinging’ a server, which may be used for alerting administrators of unresponsive servers.

Monit is a server-watching utility which alerts administrators when a server dies.
4.6.1.5 Dealing with DNS.

The SIP standard leverages DNS. Administrators of SIP servers should be aware of the impact of DNS on a server’s operation. A server’s attempt to resolve an un-resolvable address may block the server’s process for a time, in the order of seconds. To be surer that the server does not stop responding due to being blocked by DNS-resolving, the following practices are recommended:

- Start a sufficient number of child processes. If one is blocked, the other children will keep serving;
- Use DNS caching. For example, in Linux, there is an nscd daemon available for this purpose;
- Process transactions statefully if memory allows. That helps to absorb retransmissions without having to make DNS queries for each of them.

### 4.6.2 SIP Express Router

SIP Express Router (SER) is an industrial-strength, free VoIP server based on the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP, RFC3261). It is engineered to power IP Telephony infrastructures up to large scale. The server keeps track of users, sets up VoIP sessions, relays instant messages and creates space for new plug-in applications. Its proven interoperability guarantees seamless integration with components from other vendors, eliminating the risk of a single-vendor trap. It has successfully participated in various interoperability tests along with products of other leading SIP vendors.

#### 4.6.2.1 Getting SIP Express Router

SIP Express Router is available for download from BerliOS

The newest release can be found in the folder `/latest`.

#### 4.6.2.2 Installation (From binary packages)

##### 4.6.2.2.1 Supported architectures

The following architectures are supported by SER:
- Linux/i386;
- Linux/armv4l;
- FreeBSD/i386;
- OpenBSD/i386;
- Solaris/sparc64;
- NetBSD/sparc64

(For other architectures, the Makefiles might need to be edited). There are various configuration options defined in the Makefile and Makefile.defs.

##### 4.6.2.2.2 Requirements

* gcc or icc : gcc >= 2.9x; >= (3.1 recommended. It will work with older version but it might require some options tweaking for best performance.)
* bison or yacc (Berkeley yacc)
* flex
* GNU make (on Linux this is the standard make, on FreeBSD and Solaris is called gmake)
* sed and tr (used in the make files)
* GNU tar (gtar on Solaris) and gzip if you want make tar to work.
* GNU install or BSD install (on Solaris ginstall) if you want make install, make bin, and make sunpkg to work.
* mysql if you need MySQL support.
* apache (httpd) if you want serweb support
* PHP, MySQL-PHP for serweb support
* libmysqlclient and libz (zlib) if you want MySQL support (the MySQL module)
* libexpat if you want the Jabber gateway support (the Jabber module)

4.6.2.3 Install the packages:
Example:
/root>rpm -i ser-08.11-1.i386.rpm

Packages for other popular distributions are available, and can be installed using the appropriate package manager for that distribution.

On many platforms you can start the ser service using:
/etc/init.d/ser start

Red Hat-based systems will use:
/etc/rc.d/init.d/ser start

That will start the server with the default configuration. You can try to register your SIP user agent (for example, MS Messenger) with the server, place first calls as well as send instant messages to other users registered with this server.

The default configuration is very limited. Its purpose is to allow the starting to start the server easily and to test the basic functionality. The default configuration does not include authentication, the persistence of the user location database and many other important features.

~ 4.6.2.3 MySQL setup

To install support for a MySQL database, you will need to download the package ser-mysql, which is available from the same location from which you downloaded SIP Express Router. This package contains scripts to create the required database and establish permissions for preconfigured accounts. A recent release of MySQL is recommended. You should definitely use version higher than 4.0. Earlier versions may have problems with the syntax required to set permissions in the database.

If you do not already have a copy of MySQL installed, download it from http://www.mysql.com or check out your Linux distribution. Many popular Linux packages come with the MySQL server pre-packaged.
Once you have the MySQL server installed and running, execute
/usr/sbin/ser_mysql.sh create

That will create database ‘ser’ and all the tables that are required by SER.
You can verify that the database has been created and correct permissions assigned by using the
MySQL management tool and these steps:

Mysql> select * from user;
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host</th>
<th>User</th>
<th>Password</th>
<th>Select_priv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>ser</td>
<td>4e633cf914a735a0</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>localhost</td>
<td>ser</td>
<td>4e633cf914a735a0</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>serro</td>
<td>7cb73a267cb7bd5f</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>localhost</td>
<td>serro</td>
<td>7cb73a267cb7bd5f</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above results show that the two users, ser and serro, have been created and granted the
permissions needed to access the database. Note that, in the above example, the permissions have
been modified to deny access to these accounts from any system (%) other than the local host.

mysql> connect ser;
Connection id:    294
Current database: ser

mysql> show tables;
+-----------------+
| Tables_in_ser   |
+-----------------+
| acc             |
| active_sessions |
| aliases         |
| config          |
| event           |
| grp             |
| location        |
| missed_calls    |
| pending         |
| phonebook       |
| reserved        |
| silo            |
| subscriber      |
| version         |
+-----------------+
14 rows in set (0.00 sec)

mysql> select * from subscriber;
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>phplib_id</th>
<th>USERNAME</th>
<th>PASSWORD</th>
<th>FIRST_NAME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 4cefa7a4d3c8c2dbf6328520bd873a19 | admin  | heslo | first |...
The previous query shows that you have one user account defined and it has administrator privileges. Users with administrator privileges will be allowed to use the admin interface of Serweb.

Another account needs to be the administrator for your realm. That will be done later.

### 4.6.2.4 Configuration

#### 4.6.2.4.1 Overview

This section demonstrates simple examples of how to configure the server's behaviour using the SER request routing language. All configuration scripts follow the SER language syntax, which dictates the following section ordering:

- **Global configuration parameters**: these values affect the behaviour of the server such as port number on which it will be listening, the number of spawned children processes, and log level used for the syslog;
- **Module loading**: these statements link external modules, such as transaction management (tm) or stateless UA server (sl) dynamically;
  Note: If modules depend on each other, then the depending modules must be loaded after modules on which they depend. We recommend loading first modules tm and sl because many other modules (auth, usrloc, acc, etc.) depend on them;
- **Module-specific parameters**: determine the behaviour of modules. For example, it is possible to configure a database to be used by the authentication module;
- **One or more route blocks**: the route blocks contain the request processing logic, which includes built-in actions as well as actions exported by modules;

Optionally, if modules supporting reply processing (currently only tm) are loaded, one or more failure_route blocks containing logic are triggered by received replies. Restrictions on use of actions within the failure_route blocks apply (see SER Administrators’ Guide for more details).

#### 4.6.2.4.2 Default configuration script

The configuration script, ser.cfg, is a part of every SER distribution and defines the default behaviour of the server. It allows users to register with the server and have requests proxied to other users registered at the same server as well as to other SIP servers.

After performing routine checks, the script looks whether an incoming request is for the served domain (administrative domain). If this is true and the request is REGISTER, SER acts as a SIP registrar and updates the user location database. Optionally, it verifies the user's identity first to avoid unauthorised contact manipulation.

**Non-REGISTER** requests for served domains are then processed using the user location database. If a contact is found for a Requested-URI, script execution proceeds to stateful forwarding, a negative 404 reply is generated otherwise. Requests targeted outside the served domain are always statefully forwarded.
Note that the default configuration settings, as set by this simple script, have several limitations. By default, authentication is turned off to avoid dependency on MySQL. Unless it is turned on, anyone can register using any name and hijack someone else's calls.

Even if authentication is turned on, there is no relationship between, authentication username and the address of record (see Section 2.2.2.2.3). That means, for example, that a user authenticating himself correctly with a 'john.doe id', may register contacts for 'gw.bush'. Site policy may wish to mandate that the authentication ID must be identical to the username claimed in the `To` header field. The auth module contains action called check_to that can be used to enforce such a policy.

No dial plan is implemented. All users are supposed to be reachable via the user-location database.

The script assumes users will be using the server's hostname as the domain part of the address of record. If users wish to use another name (domain name for example), this must be set using the alias options.

If authentication is turned on by un-commenting-related configuration options, the server will assume that the back-end authentication database contains the password in clear-text form (another option is storing HA1 strings for the digest authentication, but the strings must be generated for every administrative domain of the server separately).

Example 4.3 Example of a default configuration script

```bash
# simple quick-start config script
#

# -------- global configuration parameters ------------------------
debug=3         # debug level (cmd line: -ddddddddddd)
fork=yes
log_stderror=no  # (cmd line: -E)

/* Uncomment these lines to enter debugging mode
fork=no
log_stderror=yes
*/

check_via=no    # (cmd. line: -v)
dns=no          # (cmd. line: -r)
rev_dns=no      # (cmd. line: -R)
port=5060
children=4
fifo="/tmp/ser_fifo"

# ------------------ module loading --------------------------------
```
# Uncomment this if you want to use SQL database
#loadmodule "/usr/local/lib/ser/modules/mysql.so"

loadmodule "/usr/local/lib/ser/modules/sl.so"
loadmodule "/usr/local/lib/ser/modules/tm.so"
loadmodule "/usr/local/lib/ser/modules/rr.so"
loadmodule "/usr/local/lib/ser/modules/maxfwd.so"
loadmodule "/usr/local/lib/ser/modules/usrloc.so"
loadmodule "/usr/local/lib/ser/modules/registrar.so"
loadmodule "/usr/local/lib/ser/modules/textops.so"

# Uncomment this if you want digest authentication
# mysql.so must be loaded!
#loadmodule "/usr/local/lib/ser/modules/auth.so"
#loadmodule "/usr/local/lib/ser/modules/auth_db.so"

# ----------------- setting module-specific parameters ---------------

# -- usrloc params --

modparam("usrloc", "db_mode", 0)

# Uncomment this if you want to use SQL database
# for persistent storage and comment the previous line
#modparam("usrloc", "db_mode", 2)

# -- auth params --

# Uncomment if you are using auth module
#
#modparam("auth_db", "calculate_ha1", yes)
#
# If you set "calculate_ha1" parameter to yes (which true in this config),
# uncomment also the following parameter)
#
#modparam("auth_db", "password_column", "password")

# -- rr params --

# add value to ;lr param to make some broken UAs happy
modparam("rr", "enable_full_lr", 1)

# -------------------------  request routing logic -------------------

# main routing logic

rout{ 

  # initial sanity checks -- messages with
# max_forwards==0, or excessively long requests
if (!mf_process_maxfwd_header("10")) {
    sl_send_reply("483","Too Many Hops");
    break;
};
if (msg:len >= max_len ) {
    sl_send_reply("513", "Message too big");
    break;
};

# we record-route all messages -- to make sure that
# subsequent messages will go through our proxy; that's
# particularly good if upstream and downstream entities
# use different transport protocol
if (!method=="REGISTER") record_route();

# subsequent messages withing a dialog should take the
# path determined by record-routing
if (loose_route()) {
    # mark routing logic in request
    append_hf("P-hint: rr-enforced\n");
    route(1);
    break;
};
if (!uri==myself) {
    # mark routing logic in request
    append_hf("P-hint: outbound\n");
    route(1);
    break;
};

# if the request is for other domain use UsrLoc
# (in case, it does not work, use the following command
# with proper names and addresses in it)
if (uri==myself) {
    if (method=="REGISTER") {

        # Uncomment this if you want to use digest authentication
        # if (!_authorize("iptel.org", "subscriber")){
        #    www_challenge("iptel.org", "0");
        #    break;
        # };

        save("location");
        break;
    }
}
lookup("aliases");
if (!uri==myself) {
    append_hf("P-hint: outbound alias\r\n");
    route(1);
    break;
};

# native SIP destinations are handled using our USRLOC DB
if (!lookup("location")) {
    sl_send_reply("404", "Not Found");
    break;
};
append_hf("P-hint: usrloc applied\r\n");
route(1);
}

route[1]
{
    # send it out now; use stateful forwarding as it works reliably
    # even for UDP2TCP
    if (!t_relay()) {
        sl_reply_error();
    };
}

4.6.2.4.3 Redirect server
The redirect example shows how to redirect a request to multiple destinations using a 3xx reply. Redirecting requests as opposed to proxying them is essential to various scalability scenarios. Once a message is redirected, SER discards all related state information and is no longer involved in subsequent SIP transactions (unless the redirection addresses point to the same server again).

The key SER actions in this example are **append_branch** and **sl_send_reply** (sl module). The **append_branch** action adds a new item to the destination set. The destination set always includes the current URI. The **sl_send_reply** action, if passed SIP reply code 3xx, takes all values in the current destination set and adds them to the **Contact** header field in the reply.

Example 4.4. Redirect server

#
# this example shows use of ser as stateless redirect server
#

# ------------------ module loading ----------------------------------

loadmodule "modules/sl/sl.so"
# -------------------------  request routing logic -------------------

# main routing logic

route{
    # for testing purposes, simply okay all REGISTERs
    if (method=="REGISTER") {
        log("REGISTER");
        sl_send_reply("200", "ok");
        break;
    }
    # rewrite current URI, which is always part of destination ser
    rewriteuri("sip:parallel@iptel.org:9");
    # append one more URI to the destination ser
    append_branch("sip:redirect@iptel.org:9");
    # redirect now
    sl_send_reply("300", "Redirect");
}

4.6.2.4.4. On-Reply processing (forward on unavailable)
Many services depend on the status of messages relayed downstream, forward on busy and forward on no reply to name the two most well-known. To support implementation of such services, SER allows returning to request processing when the forwarding of a request fails. When a request is reprocessed, new request branches may be initiated or the transaction can be completed at the discretion of the script writer.

The primitives used are t_on_failure(r) and failure_route[r]{}. If the t_on_failure action is called before a request is statefully forwarded and a forwarding failure occurs, SER will return to request processing in a failure_route block. Failures include: receipt of a SIP error (status code \( \geq 300 \)) from downstream and the absence of a final reply within the final response period.

The duration of the timer is governed by parameters of the tm module. fr_timer is the duration of the timer set for non-INVITE transactions and INVITE transactions for which no provisional response is received. If the timer hits, it indicates that a downstream server is unresponsive. fr_inv_timer governs time to wait for a final reply for an INVITE. It is typically longer than fr_timer because the final reply may take a long time until the called party (finds a mobile phone in his pocket and) answers the call.

In Example 4.5, failure_route [1] is set to be entered in error using the t_on_failure (1) action. Within this reply block, SER is instructed to initiate a new branch and try to reach the called party at another destination (sip:nonsense@iptel.org). To deal with the case when none of the alternate destinations succeed, t_on_failure is set again. If this case really occurs, failure_route [2] is entered and a last resort destination (sip:foo@iptel.org) is tried.
Example 4.5 On-Reply processing
#
# example script showing both types of forking;
# incoming message is forked in parallel to
# 'nobody' and 'parallel', if no positive reply
# appears with final_response timer, nonsense
# is retried (serial forking); than, destination
# 'foo' is given last chance
#
# ------------------ module loading ----------------------------------
loadmodule "modules/sl/sl.so"
loadmodule "modules/tm/tm.so"
#
# ----------------- setting module-specific parameters ---------------
# -- tm params --
# set time for which ser will be waiting for a final response;
# fr_inv_timer sets value for INVITE transactions, fr_timer
# for all others
modparam("tm", "fr_inv_timer", 15 )
modparam("tm", "fr_timer", 10 )
#
# -------------------------  request routing logic -------------------
# main routing logic
route{
  # for testing purposes, simply okay all REGISTERs
  if (method=="REGISTER") {
    log("REGISTER");
    sl_send_reply("200", "ok");
    break;
  };
  # try these two destinations first in parallel; the second
  # destination is targeted to sink port -- that will make ser
  # wait until timer hits
  seturi("sip:nobody@iptel.org");
  append_branch("sip:parallel@iptel.org:9");
  # if we do not get a positive reply, continue at reply_route[1]
  t_on_failure("1");
  # forward the request to all destinations in destination set now
  t_relay();
}
failure_route[1] {
  # forwarding failed -- try again at another destination
  append_branch("sip:nonsense@iptel.org");
}
log(1,"first redirection\n");
    # if this alternative destination fails too, proceed to ...
    t_on_failure("2");
    t_relay();
}

failure_route[2] {
    # try out the last resort destination
    append_branch("sip:foo@iptel.org");
    log(1, "second redirection\n");
    # we no more call t_on_negative here; if this destination
    # fails too, transaction will complete
    t_relay();
}

4.6.2.4.5 Accounting
In some scenarios, like termination of calls in the PSTN, SIP administrators may wish to keep
track of placed calls. SER can be configured to report on completed transactions. Reports are sent
by default to the syslog facility. Support for RADIUS and MySQL accounting exists as well.

Note that SER is by no means call-stateful. It reports on completed transactions, i.e., after a
successful call set up is reported, it drops any call-related state. When a call is terminated, a
transactional state for the BYE request is created and forgotten again after the transaction
completes. This is a feature and not a bug. Keeping the state information during transactions only
allows the achievement of significantly higher scalability. It is then up to the accounting
application to correlate call initiation and termination events.

To enable call accounting, tm and acc modules need to be loaded and requests need to be
processed statefully and labelled for accounting. This means that if you want a transaction to be
reported, the initial request must have taken the path setflag(X), t_relay in the SER script. X
must have the value configured in the acc_flag configuration option.

Also note, that, by default, only transactions that initiate a SIP dialogue (typically INVITE) visit a
proxy server. Subsequent transactions are exchanged directly between end-devices, do not visit
proxy server and cannot be reported. To be able to report on subsequent transactions, you need to
force them to visit the proxy server by turning on record routing.

Example 4.6 Configuration with enabled accounting

#  
# example: accounting calls to numerical destinations
#  
# ------------------ module loading ----------------------------------
loadmodule "modules/tm/tm.so"
loadmodule "modules/acc/acc.so"
loadmodule "modules/sl/sl.so"
loadmodule "modules/maxfwd/maxfwd.so"
loadmodule "modules/rr/rr.so"

# ----------------- setting module-specific parameters ---------------
# -- acc params --
# set the reporting log level
modparam("acc", "log_level", 1)
# number of flag, which will be used for accounting; if a message is
# labeled with this flag, its completion status will be reported
modparam("acc", "log_flag", 1 )

# ------------------------- request routing logic -------------------

# main routing logic
route{

  /* ******** ROUTINE CHECKS ********************************** */

  # filter too old messages
  if (!mf_process_maxfwd_header("10")) {
    log("LOG: Too many hops\n");
    sl_send_reply("483","Too Many Hops");
    break;
  }
  if (len_gt(max_len)) {
    sl_send_reply("513", "Wow -- Message too large");
    break;
  }

  # Process record-routing
  if (loose_route()) { t_relay(); break; }

  # labeled all transaction for accounting
  setflag(1);

  # record-route INVITES to make sure BYEs will visit our server too
  if (method=="INVITE") record_route();
# forward the request statefully now; (we need *stateful* forwarding,  
# because the stateful mode correlates requests with replies and  
# drops retransmissions; otherwise, we would have to report on  
# every single message received)
if (!t_relay()) {
    sl_reply_error();
    break;
}

4.6.2.4.6 Reporting missed calls
SER can report missed calls via the syslog facility or to MySQL. MySQL reporting can be utilised by SER's complementary Web interface, Serweb.

Reporting of missed calls is enabled by the acc module. There are two cases, in which you want to report. The first case is when a called party is offline. The other case is when a user is online, but call establishment fails. There may be many reasons for failure (call cancellation, inactive phone, busy phone, server timer, etc.), all of them leading to a negative (>=300) reply sent to the calling party. The acc module can be configured to issue a missed-call report whenever a transaction completes with a negative status.

The following configuration fragment reports a missed call in both cases. The top half of the condition reports on calls missed due to offline called party status, using the acc_request action. The action is wrapped in transactional processing (t_newtran) to guarantee that reports are not duplicated on receipt of retransmissions.

The bottom half of the condition marks transactions to online users in order to be reported on failure. That is what the setflag (3) action is responsible for, along with the configuration option log_missed_flag. This option configures SER to report on all transactions, which were marked with flag 3.

loadmodule("modules/tm/tm.so");
loadmodule("modules/acc/acc.so");
...
# if a call is labeled using setflag(3) and is missed, it will  
# be reported
...
modparam("acc", "log_missed_flag", 3");
if (!lookup("location")) {
    # call invitations to off-line users are reported using the  
    # acc_request action; to avoid duplicate reports on request  
    # retransmissions, request is processed statefully (t_newtran,  
    # t_reply)
    if ((method=="INVITE" || method=="ACK") && t_newtran() ) {
        t_reply("404", "Not Found");
        acc_request("404 Not Found");
        break;

# all other requests to off-line users are simply replied
# statelessly and no reports are issued
sl_send_reply("404", "Not Found");
break;
} else {
  # user on-line; report on failed transactions; mark the
  # transaction for reporting using the same number as
  # configured above; if the call is really missed, a report
  # will be issued
  setflag(3);
  # forward to user's current destination
  t_relay();
  break;
}

4.6.2.4.7 User aliases
Frequently, it is desirable for a user to have multiple addresses in a domain. For example, a user
with username ‘john.doe’ wants to be reachable at a shorter address ‘john’ or at a numerical
address ‘12335’, so that PSTN calling parties with numeric-only key-pads can reach him as well.

With SER, you can maintain a special user location table and translate existing aliases to canonical
usernames using the lookup action from the `usrloc` module. The following script fragment
demonstrates the use of lookup for this purpose.

Example 4.7 Configuration of use of aliases

```bash
if (!uri==myself) {  # request not for our domain...
    route(1);  # go somewhere else, where outbound requests are processed
    break;
};
# the request is for our domain -- process registrations first
if (method=="REGISTER") {  route(3);  break;  }

# look now, if there is an alias in the "aliases" table; do not care
# about return value: whether there is some or not, move ahead then
lookup("aliases");

# there may be aliases which translate to other domain and for which
# local processing is not appropriate; check again, if after the
# alias translation, the request is still for us
if (!uri==myself) {  route(1);  break;  }

# continue with processing for our domain...
...
The table with aliases is updated using the `serctl` tool. The command `serctl alias add <alias> <uri>` adds a new alias, the command `serctl alias show <user>` prints an existing alias, and the command `serctl alias rm <user>` removes it.

```
[jiri@cat sip_router]$ serctl alias add 1234 sip:john.doe@foo.bar
sip:john.doe@foo.bar
200 Added to table ('1234','sip:john.doe@foo.bar') to 'aliases'
[jiri@cat sip_router]$ serctl alias add john sip:john.doe@foo.bar
sip:john.doe@foo.bar
200 Added to table ('john','sip:john.doe@foo.bar') to 'aliases'
[jiri@cat sip_router]$ serctl alias show john
<sip:john.doe@foo.bar>;q=1.00;expires=1073741811
[jiri@cat sip_router]$ serctl alias rm john
200 user (aliases, john) deleted
```

Note that the persistence of records needs to be turned on in the `usrloc` module. All changes to aliases would otherwise be lost on server reboot. To enable the persistence, set the `db_mode` `usrloc` parameter to a non-zero value.

```
# ....load module ...
loadmodule "modules/usrloc/usrloc.so"
# ... turn on persistence -- all changes to user tables are immediately
# flushed to mysql
modparam("usrloc", "db_mode",   1)
# the SQL address:
modparam("usrloc", "db_url","mysql://ser:secret@dbhost/ser")
```

---

### 4.6.2.5 Operation

#### 4.6.2.5.1 User management

There are two tasks related to the management of SIP users: maintaining user accounts and maintaining user contacts. Both of these jobs can be done using the `serctl` command-line tool. The complimentary Web interface, Serweb, can be used for this purpose as well.

If user authentication is turned on, which is highly advisable, user accounts must be created before users can log in. To create a new user account, use the `serctl` add utility with the username, password and e-mail as parameters. It is important that the environment variable `SIP_DOMAIN` is set to your domain and matches the realm values used in your script. The realm value is used for calculation of credentials stored in the subscriber database, which are bound permanently to this value.

```
[jiri@cat gen_ha1]$ export SIP_DOMAIN=foo.bar
[jiri@cat gen_ha1]$ serctl add newuser secret newuser@foo.bar
MySql Password:
new user added
```
serctl can also change the user's password or remove existing accounts from the system permanently.

[jiri@cat gen_ha1]$ serctl passwd newuser newpassword
MySQL Password:
password change succeeded
[jiri@cat gen_ha1]$ serctl rm newuser
MySQL Password:
user removed

Typically, user contacts are automatically uploaded by SIP phones to the server during the registration process and administrators do not need to worry about them. However, users may wish to append permanent contacts to PSTN gateways or to locations in other administrative domains. To manipulate the contacts in such cases, use the serctl ul tool. Note that this is the only correct way to update contacts --- direct changes of the back-end MySQL database do not affect a server's memory. Also note, that if persistence is turned off (usrloc db_mode parameter set to 0), all contacts will be lost on server reboot. Make sure that the persistence is enabled if you add permanent contacts.

To add a new permanent contact for a user, call serctl ul add <username> <contact>. To delete all users' contacts, call serctl ul rm <username>. The command serctl ul show <username> prints all current contacts of this user.

[jiri@cat gen_ha1]$ serctl ul add newuser sip:666@gateway.foo.bar
sip:666@gateway.foo.bar
200 Added to table
('newuser','sip:666@gateway.foo.bar') to 'location'
[jiri@cat gen_ha1]$ serctl ul show newuser
<sip:666@gateway.foo.bar>;q=1.00;expires=1073741812
200 user (location, newuser) deleted
[jiri@cat gen_ha1]$ serctl ul show newuser
404 Username newuser in table location not found

4.6.2.5.2 Access control (PSTN gateway)
It is often important to exercise some sort of access control. A typical case is when SER is used to guard a PSTN gateway. If a gateway could not be well-guarded, unauthorised users would be able to use it to make calls to the PSTN, inflicting high costs.

There are a few issues you need to understand when configuring SER for this purpose. First, if a gateway is built or configured to accept calls from anywhere, calling parties may easily bypass your access control server and communicate with the gateway directly. You then need to enforce, at transport layer, that signalling is only accepted if coming via SER and deny SIP packets coming from other hosts and port numbers. Your network must be configured not to allow forged IP addresses. Also, you need to turn on record routing to assure that all session requests will travel via SER. Otherwise, calling party's devices would send subsequent SIP requests directly to your gateway, which would fail because of transport filtering.
Authorisation (i.e., the process of determining who may call where) is facilitated in SER using the group membership concept. Scripts make decisions on whether a calling party is authorised to make a call to a specific destination, based on the user's membership in a group. For example, a policy may be set up to allow calls to international destinations, only to users who are members of ‘int’ group. Before a user's group membership is checked, his identity must be verified. Without cryptographic verification of the user's identity, it would be impossible to confirm that a calling party really is who he claims to be.

The following script demonstrates how to configure SER as an access control server for a PSTN gateway. The script verifies user identity using digest authentication, checks user's privileges, and forces all requests to visit the server.

Example 4.8 Script for gateway access control

```bash
loadmodule "modules/sl/sl.so"
loadmodule "modules/tm/tm.so"
loadmodule "modules/acc/acc.so"
loadmodule "modules/rr/rr.so"
loadmodule "modules/maxfwd/maxfwd.so"
loadmodule "modules/mysql/mysql.so"
loadmodule "modules/auth/auth.so"
loadmodule "modules/auth_db/auth_db.so"
loadmodule "modules/group/group.so"
loadmodule "modules/uri/uri.so"

# ----------------- setting module-specific parameters ---------------
modparam("auth_db", "db_url","mysql:ser:heslo@localhost/ser")
modparam("auth_db", "calculate_ha1", yes)
modparam("auth_db", "password_column", "password")

# -- acc params --
modparam("acc", "log_level", 1)
# that is the flag for which we will account -- don't forget to
# set the same one :-)  
modparam("acc", "log_flag", 1 )

# -------------------------  request routing logic -------------------
# main routing logic
route{
    /* ********* ROUTINE CHECKS  ********************************** */

    # filter too old messages
    if (!mf_process_maxfwd_header("10") ) {
        log("LOG: Too many hops\n");
        sl_send_reply("483","Too Many Hops");
        break;
    }
```
if (len_gt( max_len )) {
    sl_send_reply("513", "Wow -- Message too large");
    break;
};
/* ********* RR ********************************** */
/* grant Route routing if route headers present */
if (loose_route()) { t_relay(); break; }
/* record-route INVITEs -- all subsequent requests must visit us */
if (method=="INVITE") {
    record_route();
}
#
# now check if it really is a PSTN destination which should be handled
# by our gateway; if not, and the request is an invitation, drop it --
# we cannot terminate it in PSTN; relay non-INVITE requests -- it may
# be for example BYEs sent by gateway to call originator
if (!uri=~"sip:\+?[0-9]*@.*") {
    if (method=="INVITE") {
        sl_send_reply("403", "Call cannot be served here");
    } else {
        forward(uri:host, uri:port);
    }
    break;
}
#
# account completed transactions via syslog
setflag(1);
# free call destinations ... no authentication needed
if ( is_user_in("Request-URI", "free-pstn") /* free destinations */
    | uri="sip:[79][0-9][0-9][0-9]@.*" /* local PBX */
    | uri="sip:98[0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9]"
    )
    log("free call");
) else if (src_ip==192.168.0.10) {
# our gateway does not support digest authentication;
# verify that a request is coming from it by source
# address
    log("gateway-originated request");
) else {
# in all other cases, we need to check the request against
# access control lists; first of all, verify request
# originator's identity

    if (!proxy_authorize( "gateway" /* realm */,
                        "subscriber" /* table name */)) {
        proxy_challenge( "gateway" /* realm */, "0" /* no qop */ );
    }
break;
);

# authorise only for INVITEs -- RR/Contact may result in weird
# things showing up in d-uri that would break our logic; our
# major concern is INVITE which causes PSTN costs
if (method=="INVITE") {

    # does the authenticated user have a permission for local
    # calls (destinations beginning with a single zero)?
    # (i.e., is he in the "local" group?)
    if (uri=~"sip:0[1-9][0-9]+@.*") {
        if (!is_user_in("credentials", "local")) {
            sl_send_reply("403", "No permission for local calls");
            break;
        };
    }
    # the same for long-distance (destinations begin with two zeros")
    } else if (uri=~"sip:00[1-9][0-9]+@.*") {
        if (!is_user_in("credentials", "ld")) {
            sl_send_reply("403", " no permission for LD ");
            break;
        };
    }
    # the same for international calls (three zeros)
    } else if (uri=~"sip:000[1-9][0-9]+@.*") {
        if (!is_user_in("credentials", "int")) {
            sl_send_reply("403", "International permissions needed");
            break;
        };
    }
    # everything else (e.g., interplanetary calls) is denied
    } else {
        sl_send_reply("403", "Forbidden");
        break;
    };
}

}; # INVITE to authorised PSTN

}; # authorised PSTN

# if you have passed through all the checks, let your call go to GW!
rewritehostport("192.168.0.10:5060");

# forward the request now
if (!t_relay()) {
    sl_reply_error();
    break;
};

}
Use the `serctl` tool to maintain group membership. The command `serctl acl grant <username> <group>` makes a user member of a group, the command `serctl acl show <username>` shows groups of which a user is member, and the command `serctl acl revoke <username> [ <group> ]` revokes a user's membership in one or all groups.

```
[jiri@cat sip_router]$ serctl acl grant john int
MySQL Password:
+------+-----+---------------------+
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>user</th>
<th>grp</th>
<th>last_modified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>john</td>
<td>int</td>
<td>2002-12-08 02:09:20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
+------+-----+---------------------+
```

~ 4.6.3 Asterisk

In this section we will describe an example configuration of the Asterisk PBX. We will focus mainly on the configuration of the SIP part.

~ 4.6.3.1 Getting Asterisk

Asterisk can be downloaded from [http://www.digium.com](http://www.digium.com)

~ 4.6.3.2 Installation

Download the `tarball` and `untar` it using:

```
tar xvzf asterisk-0.5.0.tar.gz
```

Compile the sources:

```
- # cd asterisk-0.5.0
- # make
- # make install
- # make samples
```

~ 4.6.3.3 Configuration

The configuration files can be found in the `/etc/asterisk` directory. The most important files are: `sip.conf` which contains configuration of SIP user agent and `extensions.conf` which defines the dialling plan.

In this simple example, Asterisk is configured to act as a simple back-to-back user agent. It will allow SIP user agents to register to it and make calls which will be routed to an outbound proxy.
The file `sip.conf` contains the following settings:

```
[general]
port = 5060          ; Port to bind to
bindaddr = 0.0.0.0   ; Address to bind to
context = from-sip  ; Default for incoming calls

register => asterisk:password@iptel.org/jan ; Register with a SIP provider

[iptel]
type=friend
username=asterisk
secret=password
fromdomain=iptel.org
host=iptel.org

[jan]
type=friend
username=jan
;secret=blah
host=dynamic
canreinvite=no
```

Section `general` contains some generic settings. Configure Asterisk to listen on port 5060 and to listen on all available interfaces. Specify context to be `from-sip`. The same context must be later configured in `extensions.conf`!

The line beginning with `register` instructs Asterisk to act as a user agent and register with the `iptel.org` server as user `asterisk` with password, `password`. The `/jan` part indicates that all incoming calls to user `asterisk` will be forwarded to user `jan`, registered at the Asterisk server.

Section `iptel` contains configuration of a peer. In this case, it is the `iptel.org` proxy server, because we will be using this server as an outbound proxy. In this section, the parameter `fromdomain` is specified, because we want all outgoing messages to have this domain in the `From` header field.

The last section, `jan`, contains credentials and data for a user that will be able to register with the Asterisk server. In this case, one SIP phone is configured with username `jan` and with an empty password and with a phone that will be registered with the Asterisk server to receive calls for username `jan`. 

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The file `extensions.conf` contains the following settings:

```
[from-sip]
exten => jan,1,Dial(SIP/jan)
exten => jan,2,Hangup
exten => _3.,1,SetCallerID(jan)
exten => _3.,2,SetCIDName(Jan Janak)
exten => _3.,3,Dial(SIP/${EXTEN:1}@iptel)
exten => _3.,4,Playback(invalid)
exten => _3.,5,Hangup
```

The first line describes the context which we have already configured in `sip.conf`. The following lines describe the dialling plan. The `exten` directive means that the extension of the call will be processed. The first parameter after the `=>` is the extension. If the extension starts with an underscore then it will be treated as an expression. Otherwise only an exact match will be accepted.

In the example, the first two lines match the extension `jan`. The rest of the lines will match any extension starting with digit 3.

The second parameter is the preference of the line in the dialling plan. The last parameter is the action to be executed when the extension matches. The first line says that calls with extension `jan` will be routed to SIP and peer `jan`.

Any extensions beginning with 3 will be routed to the `iptel.org` server using SIP and username `jan` will be set as the calling party ID. If a call fails then Asterisk will reply with an error message.

### 4.6.4 VOCAL

#### 4.6.4.1 Overview

The Vovida Open Communication Application Library (VOCAL) is an open source project targeted at facilitating the adoption of Voice over IP in the marketplace. VOCAL provides the development community with software and tools needed to build Voice over IP features, applications and services. The VOCAL system is a distributed network of servers that provides Voice Over Internet Protocol (Voice over IP) telephony services. VOCAL supports devices that communicate using the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP, RFC3261). VOCAL also supports analogue telephones via residential gateways. VOCAL supports on-network and off-network calling. Off-network calling enables subscribers to connect to parties through either the Internet or the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN).

The basic software in VOCAL includes a set of SIP-based servers (Redirect Server, Feature Server, Provisioning Server and Marshal Proxy Server). This is the stable development branch of the VOCAL server. Moreover, even if the following applications are not included in the current release (1.5.0), their source code remains available in the CVS archive http://www.vovida.org/cgi-bin/fom?file=556:
- SIP to MGCP translator
- Policy server
- Conference proxy server
- SIP to H.323 translator
- JTAPI feature server
- SIP User Agent (replaced by SIPset)
- SNMP/NetMgmt

For a more detailed overview of the VOCAL system please refer to: http://www.vovida.org

~ 4.6.4.2 Installation

If you have a previous installation of VOCAL that uses the vocalstart executable to run, you must stop all servers with vocalstart stop. Note that vocalstart is no longer used, as of version 1.4.0. In order to perform this action and to install VOCAL, you must be logged in as root in your Linux system.

There are two options for downloading and installing VOCAL:
- Installing from RPM:
  - Download vocalbin-version-x.i386.rpm from http://www.vovida.org
  - Install the RPM as root, typing rpm -U vocalbin-version-x.i386.rpm.

Installing from source:
Type the following sequence of commands:

```
./configure
make
make install
```

You must become root before executing make install.

If you want to have more information about compiling and installing VOCAL please refer to the file BUILD.txt.

~ 4.6.4.3 Configuration

To set up a basic configuration, you have to use the configuration script indicated here:

```
/usr/local/vocal/bin/allinoneconfigure/allinoneconfigure
```

Running the allinoneconfigure script, you will be asked a number of questions. For basic services setup, answer all questions with the default answers.

After such a default configuration, an Apache Web Server has been reconfigured on your Linux machine to provide basic Web-based configuration (provisioning in VOCAL terms) and must be restarted for this to take effect.
In order to restart the Apache Web Server you should run:
/etc/rc.d/init.d/httpd restart

When the Apache Web Server is restarted you will be able to use the Web-based provisioning of the VOCAL system. In order to start provisioning your system you will have to point a browser to:
http://your.server.name/vocal/

You will be prompted for a password. The username is vocal. During configuration, you were asked to enter a password or choose to have one generated for you. If you have forgotten the password from that step, you can regenerate one by running the command:

allinoneconfigure -r

After you have run the allinoneconfigure script, make sure that your VOCAL system is running typing the following command:

/usr/local/vocal/bin/vocalctl status

You have to make sure that you are able to see all of the necessary processes, as follows:

fs 5080 14957
fs 5085 14955
ms 5060 15002
...

If, instead of such a list of actively running servers with the details of the ports they are listening to, you see vocald is not running, then your VOCAL system is not running because something went wrong in the configuration.

If your VOCAL system is running, you can verify your installation by running the verify sip command.

Passing it the -a option causes verify sip to create two test users, test1000 and test1001, and make a call from test1000 to test1001. After testing, verify sip will remove the two users. You should be able to run it with a command like this:

/usr/local/vocal/bin/verify sip -a

If the installation is OK, you should see the following text:

VOCAL basic call test passed.
4.6.4.4 Operation

VOCAL 1.5.0 comes with two provisioning systems. Both work on the same configuration data. The first, uses a Java application to configure the system. The second uses Web-based CGI scripts, which run on the Web server to configure and control VOCAL. It can be accessed through your Web browser. The Web-based provisioning system provides simple access to the most commonly used provisioning options for an all-in-one system. The Java-based application provides complete view to the server's features, and dial plan provisioning.

Both provisioning systems can be used on the same system, but they should not be run at the same time. The Web-based provisioning system is more limited than the Java-based one, thus some tasks require using the latter. For tasks other than those requiring the Java provisioning system, we recommend using the Web-based provisioning system. The provisioning systems allow the system administrators to work with user and server data. Administrators can choose to Add, View, Edit and Delete Users, as well as insert details of the clients/users allowed access to the VOCAL services.

Server data can be used to configure services, as well as install more advanced features.

4.6.4.5 Endpoint authentication

The server in charge of authentication in the VOCAL system is the Marshal Proxy Server. The Marshal Proxy Server supports these authentication options:

- No authentication;
- Access control authentication - verification of IP address.
- HTTP Digest authentication - verification of username and password.

4.6.4.6 Advanced features

There are a lot of advanced features that can be deployed on VOCAL architecture. In this section, an overview of these features is presented. For a more detailed explanation please refer to the VOCAL Web pages.

Each Marshal Proxy Server sends the start and stop time of a call to the Call Detail Record (CDR) Server. The CDR Server may forward the data to 3rd party billing systems using the RADIUS accounting protocol.

Redirection of calls, integration with PSTN gateways and conferencing are configured and exploited using other special kinds of Marshal Servers.

Support for both SIP to H.323 Gateways and SIP to MGCP Gateways is under development and the actual implementation is not yet ready to be used in a production environment, even if improvements are planned in the near future.
Dial plans are easily managed by configuring entries in the provisioning system GUI. Redirection services and backup servers, as well as more features like call forwarding and call blocking are carried out using specialised servers. Last, but not least, a voice mail server is used to deliver mail with attached voice files containing messages registered to the users.

~ 4.7 Firewalls and NAT

Firewalls and Network Address Translation (NAT) affect IP Telephony signalling protocols, making it impossible to call targets outside the private or protected network. While firewalls and NATs often go hand in hand, they impose two different problems which are described here.

~ 4.7.1 Firewalls and IP Telephony

Both SIP and H.323 calls use a number of different ports, out of which only the signalling ports are well defined - TCP port 1720 for H.323 and TCP port 5060 (early versions of SIP used 5060 UDP as well). To be able to place and receive calls to/from outside the protected network, opening these ports is the minimum requirement.

After signalling has started, further channels are required. H.323 often uses a separate TCP connection for capability exchange (H.245), which uses dynamically assigned port numbers. Likewise the RTP media stream uses dynamically assigned port numbers on each side. The only restriction that applies to these ports is that they are in the port range > 1023.

As a result, a firewall protected IP Telephony zone needs either a firewall that does not protect ports > 1023 or a firewall that is IP Telephony-aware, meaning that it monitors all SIP and H.323 messages in order to open and close the required ports on the fly. A third alternative is to deploy an H.323 or SIP Proxy outside the zone protected by the firewall, perhaps in a DMZ, and configure the firewall to allow communication of endpoints only with this proxy. This is a mid-level security approach, as it permits the relatively safe communication between protected endpoints and a trusted proxy server outside the firewall. This document does not intend to give an overview of suitable firewall solutions, so when installing IP Telephony solutions, ensure that your firewall supports them.

~ 4.7.2 NAT and IP Telephony

Another problem occurs if your IP Telephony zone resides in a private network (no public IP addresses). SIP and H.323 use TCP for signalling, but the messages carried in the application layer contain IP addresses that are not recognised by the NAT. In addition, the H.323 RAS channel uses UDP for transport. This combination results in the following problems:

1. Registration: Consider an endpoint which lies inside a private network and registers at a public server. Without being aware of the NAT, it would try to register with its private IP address. Eventually the server’s reply would reach the endpoint, but no call that the server tries to put through using the registered address will;
2. Call signalling: Some call signalling messages contain IP addresses that are necessary for subsequent communication, e.g., the IP address (and port) to which media data will be sent. Usually, an endpoint transmits its local (private) IP address, causing the communication partner to fail when trying to connect to that IP address.

One possible solution is the STUN protocol, defined in RFC 3489. An endpoint implementing this protocol connects to a public STUN server to be informed of his public IP address. The result of this query is used as the IP address to register with at a remote server. While STUN seems to be more popular in the SIP world, there is no H.323 endpoint that we are aware of that supports this feature.

Another possibility is to use a router that is aware of IP Telephony protocols and rewrites the IP addresses within the application layer messages, as they are routed. But this requires full decoding and encoding support for SIP and/or H.323, which is simple for the text-based SIP protocol but quite complex for the ASN.1-based H.323 protocol. In addition, it is always possible that such a router might remove all message content it does not understand, so that trying to transport new protocol features through such a router may inexplicably fail. Such an IP Telephony router may come in the form of an application running on the NAT router itself—like the OpenH323Proxy.

### 4.7.3 SIP and NAT

#### 4.7.3.1 Overview

Since the start of deployment of SIP-based devices for Internet telephony, there have been problems with traversing NAT. There are several reasons why SIP does not work through NAT properly:

- Addresses used for the communication and that is changed by NATs;
- From its beginning, SIP has been designed without considering NAT scenarios. This allows the design of a protocol that is highly scalable but imposes many restrictions later;
- SIP is very flexible so it is hard to implement SIP support into NAT devices;
- End-to-end communication for hosts behind two different NATs is often not possible.

Many proposals for NAT traversal have been created recently, but none of them works universally or are applicable to all real-world scenarios. The proposals include Connection Oriented Media, STUN, TURN, SIP ALG and so on.

All the proposals have been collected into one single document which is called ICE. ICE stands for Interactive Connectivity Establishment. It is a methodology for traversing NAT, but it is not a new protocol. It is a collection of all previously mentioned attempts to traverse NAT which work universally. The methodology is quite complex and requires mutual cooperation of all endpoints involved in the communication.

Although it works universally, such a solution is hard to implement. This section describes a solution that is based on ICE, but with a couple of assumptions and simplifications. That will result in a significantly simpler implementation, which is supported by almost any SIP devices available today and which works in most real-world scenarios.

The price for the simplifications will be the use of an RTP relay in cases where it is not absolutely necessary, but such cases seem to be quite rare. The simpler solution will also impose higher requirements on SIP devices. Fortunately, most manufacturers seem to have implemented all necessary features already.

The scenario, as presented in following subsections, assumes that the SIP Proxy is in the public Internet and SIP user agents are behind NAT.

4.7.3.1.1 Symmetric signalling
One of requirements laid on SIP devices that should work behind NAT is support for symmetric signalling. Normally each SIP user agent is listening on port 5060 for incoming SIP traffic. This port number is usually advertised in the Via header field so that replies will come back on the proper port and not to the port from which the request was sent, and the port number will be also registered in the registrar so any subsequent messages will be sent to 5060 as well.

When sending SIP messages, the user agent is allowed to use a completely different socket, which means that the source port number of the outgoing SIP messages will be different. It will be not 5060 and usually it is some high port number assigned by the operating system.

That works well when there is no NAT device along the path, but it will not work when the user agent is behind a NAT. The reason is that NATs usually do not allow any traffic to the private network unless there was a packet sent from the same IP and port to the public Internet. That means that if a host with a private IP address, 192.168.0.1, wants to receive a packet on port 5060 from a host 1.2.3.4 (which is in the public Internet), it has to first send a packet with source port 5060 to host 1.2.3.4. The packet will create a binding in the NAT and the NAT box will forward replies from 1.2.3.4 to 192.168.0.1.

The binding will expire if there is no traffic for some interval. However, it is clear that a SIP user agent behind NAT, listening on port 5060, will not be able to receive any traffic to that port unless it sends a packet through the NAT with source port 5060.

That is the principle of symmetric signalling. In other words, the SIP user agents, using symmetric signalling, send SIP messages from the same source port on which they receive incoming SIP messages (usually 5060). This is the only that way they will be able to create a binding in the NAT that will allow incoming SIP traffic through.

Fortunately, the vast majority of developers of SIP devices seem to understand this, so almost all SIP devices that are available today support symmetric signalling. That includes Cisco phones, Windows Messenger, Mitel phones, Grandstream, Snom, X-lite and kphone (from version 3.13).

Support for symmetric signalling is a must and SIP user agents not supporting it will not work behind NAT's.

4.7.3.1.2 Symmetric media
There is a similar problem getting media streams through NATs. Here again, the party behind NAT must send the first media packet to create a binding, and open a pinhole in the NAT box.
Similarly, a user agent behind NAT must send a media packet with a source port that is same as the port on which the user agent expects media from remote party and which was advertised in the SDP. This is the only that way media will be able to pass the NAT in both directions.

In addition, the remote party (which is in the public Internet) must ignore the contents of SDP and send the media, not to the IP and port which it received SDP, but to the IP and port from which are media from the remote party is coming. That will be the public IP of the NAT box.

This approach is called Connection-Oriented Media and is also known as Symmetric Media.

It will work when one party is behind a NAT and the other party is in the public Internet. In that case, the party behind NAT will send the first packet and the party in the public Internet will use the first packet to determine the IP and port to which it should send.

When both parties are behind two different NATs, this approach will not work. The reason is very simple. Since both SIP user agents are behind NAT, both of them need to send the first media packet to open pinholes in NAT. Both of them will use the data received in SDP, but that will not work because the NATs might have changed the port number.

To solve the situation, an intermediary in the public Internet will be necessary, an RTP proxy. The RTP proxy will receive all the media traffic from both parties and send it to the other side. Because it will be located in the public Internet, it can wait for the first media packet from both sides and send subsequent media packets to IPs and ports from which it received the first packets.

### 4.7.3.2 Support in SIP user agents

In order to work behind NATs, SIP user agents must support symmetric signalling and symmetric media. In addition to this, they should also be able to use an outbound proxy, because all SIP traffic has to go through a SIP Proxy in the Internet.

The vast majority of SIP user agents available today can work properly behind NATs.

### 4.7.3.3 Support in the SIP server

Most of the burden with traversing NATs is on the SIP server in the public Internet. The SIP server must do the following:

- Detect if a SIP user agent is behind NAT;
- Change the contents of the SIP message if necessary;
- Force using of RTP proxy if direct communication is not possible;
- Periodically send short packets to SIP user agents behind NAT to keep the bindings open.

All the necessary NAT traversal features are implemented in the SIP Express Router available from iptel.org. Below is a brief description how the NAT traversal support works in the server.
4.7.3.3.1 Registration

When the server receives a registration, it tries to find out if the sender is behind a NAT. It does so by comparing the IP address from which the request came with IP address in Via of the sender. If they differ, then the user is behind a NAT and the information is saved into a user-location database along with his contacts.

If the previous test fails, then the proxy checks if Contacts contain private IP addresses. If so, then the user agent is also behind a NAT and the information is saved into a user-location database.

For user agents behind NAT, registrar rewrites IP addresses and ports in the Contact header fields with the IP and port from which the REGISTER came and saves the value into the user location database.

Later, when the proxy retrieves the information from the location database, it will get the rewritten values and it will send requests correctly to the IP of the NAT box which will, in turn, forward the request to the host in the private network.

4.7.3.3.2 Session Invitation

Session invitation is a little bit more complicated because of the need to minimise the use of RTP proxy.

When the server receives an INVITE message, it tries to find out if the calling party is behind a NAT. It checks again if the IP from which the request came is different from IP in the topmost Via. If they are same, then IP in Contact header field is searched for a private (RFC1918) IP address.

If the calling party is behind a NAT, then the server checks for presence of Record-Route header fields in the message. Presence of the header fields indicates that there is another proxy between the called party and the calling party and it is not necessary to rewrite the contents of Contact header field because the proxy might be behind the NAT, and, in that case, it can route private IPs properly because it is in the same network.

Otherwise, we will mark the transaction the INVITE created as behind NAT and rewrite Contact and/or SDP. This mark will be used later.

After this, the proxy server does all the processing as usual. At some point, the server performs user location table lookup to find out the current destination of the called party. You might remember that flags were saved about presence of NAT when processing the registration. If the called party is behind NAT (the flag in the user location database is set), then we will mark the transaction as behind NAT, if it is not marked yet. After this step, the transaction will be marked as behind NAT if either calling party or called party or both are behind NAT.

When the server is just about to forward the request (i.e., no other changes will be made to the request), the server will check for presence of the behind NAT mark in the current transaction. If the mark is set and the called party is not in the public Internet or does not support symmetric media, then the proxy will send a command to RTP proxy to create a session and then force the use of the RTP proxy by rewriting the contents of SDP. The same applies to 200 OK.
It has been mentioned that the use of an RTP proxy is not forced when the called party is in the public Internet and does support symmetric media, but how do we know that? Indeed, there is currently no way of finding out whether a SIP user agent supports symmetric media or not. That means that an RTP proxy is not forced, except for destinations that are known to be symmetric, like voicemail or a PSTN gateway.

### 4.7.3.4 RTP Proxy

#### 4.7.3.4.1 Overview

The RTP proxy is a very simple packet forwarder. The SIP server can talk to the RTP proxy using UNIX sockets. When the SIP Proxy receives a session invitation that will require use of the RTP proxy, then the SIP Proxy will ask the RTP proxy for a port number that will be used to forward the media.

When the RTP proxy receives the first media packets from both sides, it records the IPs and ports from which the packets came and starts relaying the media packets.

#### 4.7.3.4.2 Drawbacks

Use of the RTP proxy has some drawbacks that are worth mentioning. First of all, it introduces another hop on the path from one user agent to another and this results in increased delay. How much the delay is increased depends on the underlying network and the location of the user agents.

Secondly, the use of an RTP proxy imposes more burden on the server, because all of the media traffic has to go through the server. For example, for G.711, it is 64 kbit/s in each direction, per call. Care should be taken when building a server for RTP proxy that will receive a lot of media traffic.

### 4.7.3.5 Real-world setup

This section describes how to set up a SIP Express Router and an RTP proxy for NAT traversal. Note that both proxies (SIP and RTP) must be in the public Internet to make it work.

#### 4.7.3.5.1 SIP Express Router

First of all, it is necessary to load the `nathelper` module and configure its parameters. Put the following into the configuration file to load the module:

```
loadmodule "/usr/local/lib/ser/modules/nathelper.so"
```
Then set the following parameters:

# We will you flag 6 to mark NATed contacts
modparam("registrar", "nat_flag", 6)

# Enable NAT pinging
modparam("nathelper", "natping_interval", 60)

# Ping only contacts that are known to be
# behind NAT
modparam("nathelper", "ping_nated_only", 1)

The first parameter tells the registrar module which flag should be used to mark contacts behind NAT. The second parameter is the interval (in seconds) for keeping messages alive (to keep the NAT bindings open), and the last parameter specifies that only contacts that are behind the NAT should be pinged.

To check if the sender of a message is behind a NAT, put the following test at the beginning of the main routing section of the configuration file (right after the test for messages that are too large):

# special handling for NATed clients; first, nat test is
# executed: it looks for via!=received and RFC1918 addresses
# in Contact (may fail if line-folding used); also,
# the received test should, if complete, should check all
# vias for presence of received
if (nat_uac_test("3")) {
    # allow RR-ed requests, as these may indicate that
    # a NAT-enabled proxy takes care of it; unless it is
    # a REGISTER

    if (method == "REGISTER" || ! search("^Record-Route:")) {
        log("LOG: Someone trying to register from private IP,
rewriting\n");

        # This will work only for user agents that support symmetric
        # communication. We tested quite many of them and majority is
        # smart smart enough to be symmetric. In some phones, like
        # it takes a configuration option. With Cisco 7960, it is
        # called NAT_Enable=Yes, with kphone it is called
        # "symmetric media" and "symmetric signalling". (The latter
        # not part of public released yet.)

        fix_nated_contact(); # Rewrite contact with source IP of
        signalling
        if (method == "INVITE") {
            fix_nated_sdp("1"); # Add direction=active to SDP
        }
force_rport();  # Add rport parameter to topmost Via
setflag(6);     # Mark as NATed
);
;

The test does exactly what was described in previous sections.

At the end of the processing, perform a similar test for the called party and force the use of an
RTP proxy, if necessary. Because, potentially, there can be many places in an average configuration
script from which to send out messages (all occurrences of the \texttt{t_relay()} or \texttt{forward()} actions).
Put the whole test into a separate route section and call the section \texttt{t_relay()}.

\#
# Forcing media relay if necessary
#
route[1] {
    if (uri="[0:1](192.168.|10.|172.16)" && !search("^Route:")){
        sl_send_reply("479", "We don't forward to private IP addresses");
        break;
    }
    if (isflagset(6)) {
        force_rtp_proxy();
        t_on_reply("1");
        append_hf("P-Behind-NAT: Yes\n\n");
    }
    if (!t_relay()) {
        sl_reply_error();
        break;
    }
}

onreply_route[1] {
    if (status =~ "(183)|2[0-9][0-9]" ) {
        fix_nated_contact();
        force_rtp_proxy();
    }
} 

The route section checks if flag 6 (marks NAT) is set and if it is set, then it will force the use of
the RTP proxy. Also setup an \texttt{onreply_route} section which will process \texttt{200} OK messages (it is
necessary rewrite the Contact header field and SDP body in the reply).

4.7.3.5.2 RTP proxy
The installation and running of the RTP proxy is very simple and straightforward. First of all,
download the proxy from the PortaOne site.
Untar the archive and compile the proxy using:

```
make -f Makefile.gnu
```

This will generate a binary called `rtpproxy`. Start the proxy using `./rtpproxy` and restart SER.

SER and the RTP proxy use the socket `/var/run/rtpproxy.sock` to communicate.