Taskforce Mobility Mailarchive


Subject Re: WPA problem and eduroam
From Stefan Winter <stefan.winter@xxxxxxxxxx>
Date Thu, 04 Dec 2008 10:14:51 +0100

Hi Mark,

the draft of the advisory in its current form on my disk says sth like: We *advise* you to upgrade, but if you don't: at least consider the re-key interval change. I'm hesitant to use words like MUST in the advisory though. It's an advice, people will take it or leave it - MUST is, as you say, a word to use in a policy; and we can certainly think and discuss about the re-key becoming mandatory for TKIP networks during the policy overhaul. Waiting for a new version of the policy to be ready is not something to consider as an "immediate" countermeasure though, considering our remarkable speed in policy delivery ;-)

Greetings,

Stefan Winter

--

Stefan WINTER
Ingenieur de Recherche
Fondation RESTENA - Réseau Téléinformatique de l'Education Nationale et de la Recherche
6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi
L-1359 Luxembourg

Tel: +352 424409 1
Fax: +352 422473


----- Nachricht von mark.o'leary@xxxxxx ---------
     Datum: Thu, 4 Dec 2008 09:01:09 -0000
       Von: Mark O'Leary <mark.o'leary@xxxxxx>
Antwort an: Mark O'Leary <mark.o'leary@xxxxxx>
   Betreff: Re: [mobility] WPA problem and eduroam
        An: mobility@xxxxxxxxxx


I agree that an advisory is the way to go. My understanding is that the shorter rekeying interval completely prevents this attack (unless the site is running firmware that allows reducing the 60s backoff interval and the admin has indeed reduced it - which is against the TKIP standard). *If* this is true, then a complete policy solution to the immediate alarm would be:

If you implement WPA-TKIP or WPA2-TKIP, you MUST reduce the rekeying interval to < 5 mins

However, my concern is that this exploit opens a new attack surface on TKIP-based wireless encryption, and that it will trigger publication of a number of more dangerous elaborations on the technique in the near future. So, if we are going to communicate with the community it would be appropriate to push the 'migration to WPA2/AES' message anyway (and not do too much 'calming'), even if a modest configuration change is enough to answer the current (small) threat that we know about.

As mentioned at the meeting, I'm working on a short background paper on this attack with the JANET wireless advisory group. I'll notify the group when this is available.

M.

--
Mark O'Leary, JANET(UK)

________________________________

From: owner-mobility@xxxxxxxxxx on behalf of Stefan Winter
Sent: Wed 12/3/2008 4:39 PM
To: Josh Howlett
Cc: Tomasz Wolniewicz; mobility@xxxxxxxxxx; gn2-sa5@xxxxxxxxxxxx
Subject: RE: [mobility] WPA problem and eduroam



Hi,

So I think it is reasonable to say that our reaction needs to be
proportionate to the limited impact.

Yes, it's fine in my opinion. I suggest adding it to the advisory. We
need to be that the response is proportionate; we don't want
Institutions to panic and pull their eduroam services! We don't need
perfect security, it only needs to be Good Enough.

Yes, the advisory definitely needs proper word-smithing. It emerged
ad-hoc during a TF-EMC2 presentation and needs to be more elaborate
etc. The "calming" explanations will definitely be in there in the
final version, and very close to the beginning. It will also contain
the 5-min re-key interval advice for TKIP networks.

I'll keep working on it in the coming days.

Greetings,

Stefan




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