

Application access to directories

opening Pandora's box

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Uses of the directory

what is this good for



Uses of the directory

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Most common uses of enterprise directories



Uses of the directory

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Most common uses of enterprise directories

- 1 White pages



Uses of the directory

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Most common uses of enterprise directories

- 1 White pages
- 2 Credential repository for AuthN



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Most common uses of enterprise directories

- 1 White pages
- 2 Credential repository for AuthN
- 3 Object classification for AuthR



Uses of the directory

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Most common uses of enterprise directories

- 1 White pages
- 2 Credential repository for AuthN
- 3 Object classification for AuthR
- 4 Object information repository



AuthN

can the user prove his identity?



AuthN

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There are three main ways for checking credentials



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- Binding as the object with the credentials



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can the user prove his identity?

There are three main ways for checking credentials

- Binding as the object with the credentials
- Retrieving the object and comparing the values



AuthN

can the user prove his identity?

There are three main ways for checking credentials

- Binding as the object with the credentials
- Retrieving the object and comparing the values
- Searching for an object with the proper values



AuthR

is the user allowed to use the application?



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The object must either



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The object must either

- possess a certain attribute with a given value
- belong to a certain category of objects



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This can be verified either by



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The object must either

- possess a certain attribute with a given value
- belong to a certain category of objects

This can be verified either by

- retrieving the object and checking the attribute for the value
- searching for an object that has the appropriate values



Attribute source

what does the app need to know about the user?



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The directory can store lots of information



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- Unstructured



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The directory can store lots of information

- Unstructured
- but syntactically and semantically sound



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- bundled together on the object



Attribute source

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The directory can store lots of information

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and all of it can be provided to the applications



Least privilege principle

or the parable of the significant other



Least privilege principle

or the parable of the significant other

Main characters



Least privilege principle

or the parable of the significant other

Main characters

The user



Least privilege principle

or the parable of the significant other

Main characters

The directory



Least privilege principle

or the parable of the significant other

Main characters

The application



Least privilege principle

or the parable of the significant other



Least privilege principle

or the parable of the significant other

The plot



Least privilege principle or the parable of the significant other

The plot



Least privilege principle or the parable of the significant other

The plot



The user gives his credentials to the application



Least privilege principle or the parable of the significant other

The plot



The application gives the **user's** credentials to the directory



Least privilege principle or the parable of the significant other

The plot



The application gets **user's access** to the directory



Least privilege principle or the parable of the significant other

The plot



The user gets access to the application



Least privilege principle

or the parable of the significant other

The plot



Everyone is happy



Least privilege principle or the parable of the significant other

The plot



Everyone is happy, right?



Least privilege principle

or the parable of the significant other



Least privilege principle

or the parable of the significant other

A better plot



Least privilege principle or the parable of the significant other

A better plot



Least privilege principle or the parable of the significant other

A better plot



The user gives his credentials to the application



Least privilege principle or the parable of the significant other

A better plot



The application gives **its** credentials to the directory



Least privilege principle or the parable of the significant other

A better plot




The application gets **application's access** to the directory



Least privilege principle or the parable of the significant other

A better plot




The application checks user's credentials with the directory



Least privilege principle or the parable of the significant other

A better plot




The user gets access to the application



Least privilege principle or the parable of the significant other

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


Everyone is happy



Least privilege principle or the parable of the significant other

A better plot



Everyone is happy, or not



Filtering values

who can see what



Filtering values

who can see what

Every attribute and value is not for everyone to see



Filtering values

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Every attribute and value is not for everyone to see

- User's privacy



Filtering values

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Every attribute and value is not for everyone to see

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- Application data is not for user consumption



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- Applications should not see data for other applications



Filtering values

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Every attribute and value is not for everyone to see

- User's privacy
- Application data is not for user consumption
- Applications should not see data for other applications
- Different consumers for different values of an attribute



Controlling access to attributes

applying the least privilege principle



Controlling access to attributes

applying the least privilege principle

This has to be approached from two sides



Controlling access to attributes

applying the least privilege principle

This has to be approached from two sides

The application side An object for each application
to bind to the directory



Controlling access to attributes

applying the least privilege principle

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The application side An object for each application
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The server side ACIs for controlling access to objects,
their attributes and their values



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but...



Controlling access to attributes

applying the least privilege principle

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The application side An object for each application
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Can we trust our applications?



Controlling access to attributes

applying the least privilege principle

This has to be approached from two sides

The application side An object for each application
to bind to the directory

The server side ACIs for controlling access to objects,
their attributes and their values

but...

Can we trust our applications? All of them?



The problem
The cure
The solution

The problem is not solved

it has just been mitigated



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- Applications should not have access to users credentials



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It is clear that policies can be enforced at the server, but

- Applications should not have access to users credentials
- Applications should not have access to information pertaining to other applications



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It is clear that policies can be enforced at the server, but

- Applications should not have access to users credentials
- Applications should not have access to information pertaining to other applications
- Applications are not guaranteed to behave as expected



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- Applications should not be trusted



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- Applications should not have access to users credentials
- Applications should not have access to information pertaining to other applications
- Applications are not guaranteed to behave as expected

in all

- Applications should not be trusted

and, remember, ACIs are a nightmare to manage,
we want few of them



Solution

Single Sign On and IAM technologies



Solution

Single Sign On and IAM technologies

Applications can be forced into behaving



Solution

Single Sign On and IAM technologies

Applications can be forced into behaving

- Blocking access to user credentials



Solution

Single Sign On and IAM technologies

Applications can be forced into behaving

- Blocking access to user credentials \Rightarrow SSO



Solution

Single Sign On and IAM technologies

Applications can be forced into behaving

- Blocking access to user credentials \Rightarrow SSO
- Giving them just the information they need



Solution

Single Sign On and IAM technologies

Applications can be forced into behaving

- Blocking access to user credentials \Rightarrow SSO
- Giving them just the information they need \Rightarrow IAM



Solution

Single Sign On and IAM technologies

Applications can be forced into behaving

- Blocking access to user credentials \Rightarrow SSO
- Giving them just the information they need \Rightarrow IAM

but that is what the rest of this EuroCAMP is about



The End

time for some discussion

Questions?



The End

time for some discussion

Questions?

you might even get answers

